Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

5-1-1970

Mobility of physicians into prepaid group health
practice; a case study
Ann Schroeder Sato
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Sato, Ann Schroeder, "Mobility of physicians into prepaid group health practice; a case study" (1970).
Dissertations and Theses. Paper 107.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.107

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

!

I!
I
I

I

I
I

Title:

Mobility of PhYB1c:lrn ~ tntc Prepl.l~.a. Croup Heltlth
Pro.ctlce:

Th'.B thesis

lihtch thGae:

rank.

A Case St.udy.

1.~1

concerned

do(!tor~ l~avG

"J'li~h

chnnSeH:l ovex' time in th.)

occupied and on thair status) or

The ganorel Dxpectation 1a thnt both the rank and the

The entr'r;.nco of p11Y81ciDE1s into prcp!llc1 g:r"OUP health

2

to be the most frui ttul

of hypothesos

fWUt'CO

fOI'

this study.

Blau states that extrinsic reward" are the major incentives

tor mobility and that intrinsic

re~itu'da

interact 1'11 th

extrinsio rewards in Influencing mobilIty.
propositions

tl'TO

hypotheses "'lere generated:

From these basio
1) As tho

status of prepaid group health plans incl"easee, the status
of physicians entering these plana will increaso.

2) As the

statue of prepaId group health plans Increases. high statue

reoruits will less frequently come from positions offering
intrinsio revlsrds similar to those found 1n prepaid group
plana.

The design of this research 'Wa.s a longitud1na.l ceca
study.

Data \iere obtained relevant to one p:repE:.1d gr'oup

health plan, the Portland Kaiser FoundatIon Health Plan.
Th~

universe included 8.11 physicians \iho had pI'actlceo

cUJ

full-time, sale.rioa. staff 1n Kaiser at any t irne sinc$ 191~5

"then Kai ser '!.1as first opened to the publi c.

Inc1.icatcrs 'tlora obtained from various sources of da.ta.•
The Kaiser perconnel reoor'c3 provided data. on physic1HTIS t
6001£'.1

characteri otic 0.

Data on tho statu!); of

KD.~l

ser

CD.me

.from an offi cial so.ls.ry e,chcdule ant1. records of pepsonnel
advertlsementn.

Informants

vH:n~ lAs€(l

to i"Elnk medical schools

t::.nd tho AMA t s p-lx:££to!:l_~.t_~!?~·2.y'!lft_~.!l!t2.;·n£h~p.~L_?":~Q_.~~~!::.
~~nc~cE!.

provldccl a reI1klI1g of

te~tChing

hospitals.

The evl{1ence fer." the f'i rat hypot hes1 s 't·ms gt:rl€l:t>ally
negatl v(::.

The dc!.t.:l 1ndj, C!lt t;c.

th~tt althouf~h

tho status of'

Kaiser had increased. over the year's. the status of physi
cians entering KrdAer had docl"E)(lsea..

This conolusion vIas

reached on .the basis of f.1-ndings using prestige of med1cal
school as an indicator for physic1ans' achieved status as
well as findings usIng nationalIty and length of practice as
indicators for their asoribed status.

Thul\t the first

hypothesis of this study had to be rejeot&d.
The evidence for the second hypothesis lIas Inconclu

sive:

it Indioated that as the status of Kaiser Inoreased,

the percentage of high status recruits

fro~

certaIn posi

tions with intrinsic reuards slml1ar to Kalser's decreased,
whereas the peroentage from other positions increased.

High

status physIcians have la8S l"requently entered Kaiser
s~1. en tiflc

a) having helo. posl tiona emphasl zing the

a.spect (!

ot care, b) having mem'bershtps 1n sotentlfic or specialty
societies, c) having ohanged the location of their prllctlce,
and d) having changed their specialty.

They have mOl'e fre

quently entered Kaiser a) having had postgraduate train1ng,
b) having had at lea.st f1 va yc~.rs of trainlng, c) ha.ving hele'
Jobs in bureaucra.tic contexts, d) having

~'£l,dua.ted

medical schools in the North Central a.nd

\ve~tern

from

states J and

e) having engaged in t\tro or mora different types of act! v
lties.

In sum, it was unclear whether the second hypothesis

should be accepted or rejected.
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CHAl)TER I
INTRODUCTION

Common knol'lledge to tho observer of recent trenus in
the medical profession is the controversy "1hich has taken
place within the profession over the professional accep
tability of pl'epaid group practice.

In light of tho

American Medical Association's (AMA'S) open opposition to
prepaid group health plans) one might expeot that such plans
would be regarded by many physicians as undesirable places
topractioe.

One might also expect such plans to expo;:'i
ence difficulty in recruiting physioians. l
A question arises as to hO"1 these barrier~ to reoruit

ment might be overcome by prepaid group health plano.

In

other words, are these recruitment problems likely to he

I
, I
I
I

I
I

I

long-term or short-term trends'

Assuming that changes in

the social characteristics of physiCians enterlng prepaid
group health plans reflect changes in problems of recruit
ment, one might also ask whether or not the kinds of physl
cians ent ering prepaid gl"oup practice have val'led over time.
Thl0 thesis is concerned ,,,ith the latter question regarding

Variations in the types of physicians who enter prepaid
lDannl s C. Mc~h"'ath, "Pe:!'specti va fI.nd Participa.tion of
Physioinn::: tn Prepaid Group l'raotice, II AS!!, XXVI (1961),

601, 603.

: III
,"I

III

2

group health plans.
Thero are

tl'1O

'il

il

rea.eons tor expeoting that prepa.id

Iii
gl'CUp

health plans might gain acoeptan co within the medical pro-
fession and thereby solve their recruitment problema. It is
widely recognized that one of the goalr:; which has guided the
establishment of all prepaid group health plans is to pro
vide more efficient health cnre servioes. 2 Accordingly, it
is possible that due to the increasing need for a more effi
cient provision of health care, the demand for and accep
tance of prepaid group plana will increase.

A second goal

of prepaid group plans has been the provision of hi&l

quality medioal cere in all of the various areas of medi
cine. 3 Accordingly t the possibili ty ar1 seB that prepaid

group plune will gain acceptance by meeting the increasing
pressure for high quality medical care to a greater degree
than traditional forms.

In achieving

~wccptance

medical communlty, prepaid group plans would be

within the
~xpected

to

over'como thell" I'Ewrul tment diff10ul ties.
In sum, there is reason to believe that the

raoF~lt

mont problems of preps,icl group practice represent: E!hOI·t-tsr·m

rather ths.n long-t arm trends.

Assuming that ohanges in tho

2Ernest H. Sa\'Tard, 1<1.D. Janet D. Blank and Mer\'1yn R.
Greenliolt, "Documentation of cI\Tcnty Years of bperation .and
Growth of a Preosid Groun Praotice Plnn," Xcdical Care. VI
(Me.y-June, 196~n, 232~ Edmund K. Faltermayer-;-1TBetter O~U'G
at Less Cost \i1 thout }.ii racles, II E.2.!!~~' LXXXI (JantUlI...." ,

1970), S2-g3, 126.

;11 Giant Group Practice Bersds Ea at," ~ed'-£al_ W2!.;.1(~
News, November 1, 1965, p. 4S. F1altermayer, EO~~l'10j
LXXXI (January, 1970), S3, 126.

,II

/'

:I
I
/i

: III

Iii
'il
,I

3
sooial charaoteristics ot rvcru1t;s refleot changasliln
recruitment problems, then there is also reason to believe
that the social characteristics ot physicians entering pre
paid group health plans since their inception have system
atically varied over time.

Such variationpl'esent s a prob

lem for research, namely, to 1nquire 1nto the direotion of
and reasons for the variation.

The task of the present

thesis will be to "solve" th1s problem.
A sooiological approach 't1ill be used to guide the
presont research on variations in the social oharaoteristics
ot physicians entering prepaid group practloe for two roa

sons.

First, manpot-/er, 1. e., p3I'sonnel, 1s an im.portant

resouroe with far-reaching consequences tar any oolleotiv
ity.

Blau states that:
Another distlnot1 vo Ollal'8cteristic of intergroup
relations is that they involve mobilltJ of individ
uals trom group to group. . • • The major patterns
of those movemento redefine the boundaries ot the
eubstruot1.l!'OD in the.,macrostructure and modify thcil"
internal stTuoturos.~

.

In other words, changes in the personnel ot a given colleo
tiv1ty affect the internal structure of the collectlvity as
well as the relations bctlleen the colleotiTity and others.
The first reason for the soc1ological epprv-B.ch of this
thesis is that mvnpovior, or pel"sonnel, is

1m

important

sociolog1cal variable.
4Pater M. Blau, Exoha.~and Potcler i.ro, Sooial Life
(Nei'r Yor};::

John \'l1ley&-Sons, Inc.,

19b4f; p. 295

II

I

4
The second reason is that changes in the personnel ot
a given collectivity may bo accounted for, at least in part,
by sociological va,l"iables.

Blau goes on to state that:

liThe origin of these pattel"ns of mobility is aleo found in
the int~rrelated status structures."S

Accordingly, a socio

logical approach should be capable of predicting the direo
tion of and givlng reasons for varlations in the kinds of
physiolans l"ho have entered prepaid group plans s1nco these
plans w'ere first institutod.

Therefore, this thesis \4111

use euch an approach to describe and partit21ly aocourlt for
variations in the social characteristics ot physioians who
have entered prepaid group praotlce. 6
I •

PAST S'fUDIEB

As stated above, the problem of this thesis 1s to
describe and account tor variations in the types of
5Ib1d.
6With the help of the classificatlon of hypothep;es
found in HcGinnls, the research obj ect1 ves of this thesic
can be stated mOl'S precicely aa tolloi'IO: fInitely oondi
tional hypotheses will be generated regarding variations in
the soola.1. characterlstics of physlc1nns "tho have entered
prepa.id group practi co. Such hypotheses \-rill not be purely
descri pt i ve, when th1 s t Elrm me all s that n • • • no condi t 1 on s
are established regarding the relation of tbe variables under
conSideration to llny other8. II Neither will they be purely
explanatory, when the t arID indicat as that II • • • conditions
are speclfied for the variables x, 6 end an infinite number
of variables Zi. n Rather, the hypotheses of this study will
be finitely conditional, meaning that" ••• a condition of
statistloal independence iA required betveen variables x, Y
and a finlte numbor of othor variables zi, if the hypothe
SiB is to be true. If Hobert HcGinnls, li'Randomization and. In
ference in Sociological Research, II ASR, XXIII (195g), 11-11-412.

I

II

5
physicians entel'1ng prepa1d group practice.

A numbel' of

sociolog1cal concepts cun be used to approach this problem.
From the perspeot1ve of the 1ndiv1dual we can speak ot
mobility, wh1ch, 1n the broadest sense, can be def1ned as
the "movement of persons • • • through the social struc
ture. 17 Or, we oan talk of oaroers, 1.• a., typ1cal sequences

'of movement among a set of posit1ons.

From the perspective

of the organ1zat10n (e.g., a group of physic1ans ln a pre
pald group health plan) we can speak of reoruitment, 1.e.,
flll1ng poslt10ns wlth personnel accord1ng to a eet ot
standards.
The problem ,\,;i th whlchthis thesis deals has not
ralsed before.

The llterature on soc1al mobl1ity and re

orultment S has generally fooused on lntergcneratlonal
pat10nal mob1li ty.
physlcians.

bE~E:m

OOCU

Among such studies are t"10 which ooncern

Adams studied lntergeneratlonal occupationnl

mobll1ty among physicians fro~ 1900 to 1950. 9

Colomboto3

presented data on the relation between tho Eoo10-oconomic
status (SES) of a

physiclE~'G

family of origin {measured by

7Ne11 J. Smelser and Seymour Nar-tin Lillset (eds.),
"Soc1al Structul"e, Mobillty and Development, SOQ.1el S~~g£.::.
ture and MobllltL1n Economio Development (Ch1cago:---Aldine
Fublish1ng-COr!ipany-;-I966T-;p-.2:---Se~l-aIso Blau, pp. 162-163.
SStudies on recruitment need not be considered sepa
rately from stud1es on mob1lity and cnreers sinco the re
oruitment perspective is usually used in comblnation with
either the mobility or career perspectiveo
9Stuart Adams, "Trends ln Occupational Origins of
Physicians," ASR, XVIII (1953), 404-409.

6
the SES of his father's occupation) and his ideology.IO
This foous on inteTgenerat10nal ocoupatlonal mobility
has pers1sted even though tbe conoept of mob111ty has been
deflned ln more general terms and many other types of mob11

I

1ty, auoh sa lntro.genel"at1onal as \'lell as lnt ergenerat'.onnl,
eduoational and geographl0 as well as ocoupatlonal, have
been deemed worthy ot study.

In support of a w1der focus

wlthin stUdies on mob111ty, Wl1ensky states:

The results afflrm the need for dlverslf1ed analysls
of so01al mobl1lty flttlng the d1versity of modern
life. They underscore the wondrous varlety of phe
nomena encompassed by "mobility,1J plao1ng 1nter
generatlonal oocupational change ln perspectlve as
one among a dozen types of movement.ll

Follo\-11ng \vl1en£lky' S Buggestion, one can descrlbe the
movement of physioians bet\<ieen different l'torlt oont ext s (c. g .. p

Ii

I

solo practice, prepaid group practice, medical schools t hos-

!'

i

pitals, and the publlc health service) as mobility in the
broad Bcnse of movement through the soclal structure.

How

ever, it is not easy to identify the dimension or dimensions
10John Colc,mbotos, 118001al Origins and Ideology of
Physioians: A Study of the Effeots of Early Soclalization,"
Jour!}§!!_9!_~9al t!!_.~.!!.~~So£i~1 ~~ha.!lo~~) X OIm"oh, 1969),
Ib-:'29. It is Interes'Ging to note hot'l.the design of "hio
etudy 8.110"lS him to ignore problel;1s raised by the d1 versi
f1oation of the medical profession. His samplo oxcludes
temale physlclan8 as well as physioians on full-time salary
(e.g., medical school faculty, full-time hoopital staff, and
publio health physicians). He failo to mention that he has
also excludod physioians in prepaid group practice.
IlHarold L. Wilensky, "Measures end Effects of Mobil
1ty,1I Sooial ~t!.'!:!£~uro_!!-!!Q 1>1obil!1l, cd. Smelser and Lipset,
p. 110.

7
of mobility, if any, whioh this kind of movement entaila.
Obviously this ohange does not involve ocoupational mobil
ity--the physician remains a physician.

However, it may

lead to higher payor higher prestige for the physician and
thus l'1ould 1nvolve vertical mobility (movement bett-leen posi
tions in a status hierarchy).

It may also involve geo

. graphical mobility (change in location of residence) •
-' ~';'FortunatelY, there are data which shed light on this
definitional problem.

Aocording to Wilensky, there are

numerous systems of raruting along which mobility can occur,
one of \-1bloh is the economic opportunities of ''1orklife .12
In his faotor analysis of mob11ity he found that the choice
between self-employment and working for an employer was one
such opportunity.

These findings suggest that the movement

of physio1ans into solo versus prGpaid group practice
involves one dimension of mobility, although they do not
really tell us wast to name tna dimension.

Thus, on an

empirical baSis it appears legitimate to conceptualize the
entrance of physioians into prepaid group plans in terms of
mobility even though previous studies have not done so.
Our reviel'l of the literature on social mobility has
revealed that in foousing on only a few types of mobility,
suoh studies ignore the conceptual problem rD.i sed by the
movement of physicians

a~ong

l2 Ibid ., pp. 119-111.

different oontexta of work.

g

Llkel'riee, studies of phy siclans' careers have also ignored
this kind of problem.

HOi-lever', there appears to be no the

oretical justification for their doing so.
the term career are often general.

Definitions of

The notion 01' orderli

ness and typicallty of a soquence of events are the major

I

I;

I' I

defining characteristics of the term rather than a notion of
the context of the events forming the stages of a career.
Therefore, there appears to be no a priori reason why a
physician's "Job" history, i.e., a history of the contexts
in which he has worked, would not conntitute part of his
career.
We may cite a variety of studies on physician's
careers, none of which raise the k1nd of problem
we are concerned.

"1hioh

I I
I

In "The Stages of a l.fedlcsl Oareer" Hall

; I

~lith

describes the stages of a medical career as 1) generating

,[

,

8mbition, 2) ga1ning admittance to medical insti tut1ons,

3) acquiring a clientele, and 4) developing colleague rela
tions. l }

Ho'tlever, although these ctages may be typ1cal for

the pr1vate pract1t10ner, they w'ould not be typical for tho
physician who goes into research or teach1ng, into the pub
lic health service, or 1nto prepa1d group practioo.

In the

latter cnses the phys1cian either does not have a patient
clientele or else h1s clientele 1s acqu1red automatically
w1th his job.

Thus, one shortcoming of Haills study 1s the

l}Osl'lald Hall, liTho Stages of a Medical Career, II AJS,

LIII (19t~g), 327.

I

II,
;I
I

I
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lack of typicality of the career stages which he has
delineated.
Another shortcoming of Hall l s study is his failul"'o to
deal with the ohanges which may occur in a physioian's
career after he has made his initial efforts to acqUire a
olientele and develop colleague relations.

It is possible

I; i

'I,

i

II1.1'

i.'

I I

that the physioian's later career 1s oharacterized by typ

,II, :

ioal patterns of practice in a variety of contexts.

iii',

How'

Ii I
I

ever, Hall fails to raise the question of whether or not
these ohanges constitute stages in s physician's oareer.
In another study, IITypes of Medical Careers, tI Hall
again ignores the kind of problem being rnised in this
thesis. 14 He differentiates types of medical oareers along
the dimensions of orientations to patients and to
leagues.

001

However, he does not indioate how different career

, I

I

. I
, I
I
I ,

I .

I I
. I
I

I

I

orientations lead physicians to praotioe medicine in con
texts varying, for example, in their degree of' bureau
cratization or departure from tre.ditiona.l forms of praotioe.
Studies on physioians I c8.reer~ alAo "lere made by
Solomon15 and Liberson. 16 Solomon presents data on the
l40s-.-rald Hall,

(19 49), 243..;253·

II

Types of r'iadical Oareers," AJ8, LV

l5David N. Solomon, "Ethnio and Class Differences
among Hospitala as Contingencies in Medical Oareers, II ~..E.,

LXVI (1961), 463-471.

l6Stanley Liberson, tlEthnic Groups and the Practice of
Medicine, II ~SR, XXIII (195g), 542-5lJ-9.

,I

Ii
,i
,I
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effect of ethnic and class differences among hospitals on
physicians I careers.

H0\1ever, he considel's only an early_

stage in the physioia.n I s career, nemoly, M.s

tl~aining

period.

ethnici ty on

Liberson investigat as the effect

fIlt'

the spatial distribution and deg.t"oe of spmalization of
physicians I practices.

Thus, his study fmeuses on one oon

textual aspect of physicians I practices.

DIbt-T6Ver, he fails

to consider tne effect of ethnici ty on othel' cont extual fac
tors, e.g., the degree of

bureaucratizati~

of the context

in which a physician l<lorks.
Only one other group of studies is

r~evant

to the

present research, namely, studies by Ben-~vid,17 McElrath;g
8n<d Freidson, 19 which are specifically cOllC!erned with pre
paid group practice.

They all focus on

th~

physician's role

as it is modified in the prepaid group praetice setting and
on the phys1cian's adjustments to these role changes.

How

ever, none of them have asked how physiciams come to prac
tice in such a setting in the first plSC6!Od thus ignore
the issue raised in this thesis.
17J. Ben-DaVid, "The Proressional Role of the Physi
cian in Bureaucratized Medicine: A Study 1m Role Conflict,"
Human
...Relations,
_... Xl (l95S), 255-274.
19l-1cElrath, ~SR, XXVI (1961), 596-609..
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II.

1'HEORY

Earlier t1e discussed. aome commonly held viet1s on
trends in the medical profession in light of the con
sequenoes which these trends oould have tor prepaid group
practioe.

It

\'TaS

suggested that prepaid group plans had

Overoome problems in recruitment and that the types of
physioians entering prepaid group practice had varied over
t1me.

The objectives of tho present thesio were then

defined as an attempt to describe and account

var1

fOI-

ations in the social characteristicD of physicians who have
entered pl'epe.1d group plans since their inception.
Accordingly, we need a theory capable of goneratlng a

'I

;

, I
, I
I I

set of operatlonal1zs.ble hypotheses ooncernlng changG3 itl

I
I

I
I

the kinds of lndl vlduals enterlng prepa1.d. group health plano
over time.

As the follm"lng paragrapho uill show, it was

found that struotural-fullction8.1 and social-psychological
approaohe s failed to yield suoh hypo the see and thus '\'lere

I
L

i

,I
!

unable to dea.l '\ii th t he

probl~Ym

ot.' this thG!31s.

trast, Blou I e exchange theory in so fm.. . a.s
social mobil1 ty and. reol'ui tment
of hypotheses needod. 20

1-laS

~.t

In oon

is l"elevant to

found to pl."'oY1d.Q the lr.:lnds

20Blau, Exchan~nd. Power, pp. 294-301. Peter M.
Blau, "The Flow or-Occupational-Supply and RecrUitment,"
ASR,
--

XXX

(1965), 475-~·90.

,I

,I
,I
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Alternative Structural-Functional and
~££Iai~Psi~~~!ogi cal =!:.E:el·o~c~es~----~One example of a structur'ul-functlonal approach l'lhich
fal1ed to yield useful hypotheses for this study Is the
Davls-~foore theory of atl'atlfloation. 21

According to Davi s

and Moore, one functicnal requirement of any soclety Is
"placing and moti vating Indl vld.unls ln the so C1B.l struc
ture. "22

The fulfll1ment of tll1s reql'l.ll"ement neccesl te.t es

the availabl11 ty of appropl"iately motl va.ted and quallfled
indivlduals to fll1 any vaoant posltions ln soclety.

HOl/

ever, such a pool of lndlvlduals ls not formed automatically
when posltions are not deslrable or when they requlre exces
sive tralnlng.

Henoe, soclal stratif1catlon, the dlffer

ential dlstribution of rew'ards to positions, oocurs to
overcome such problems.
In order to determine how the Davis-Moore theory

re

lates to the entranoe of physloians into prepaid group
health plans, it will be assumed that at one time prepaid
health plnns were regarded as undesirable places to prao
tice.23

If one further assumes that a social system's

21 Kingsley Davls and Wilbert E. Moore, nS ome Princi
ples of Stratificatlon, 1\ 0l~~.L_~!~tu§..L_an~~£wer 1_ Soc;!!:1.
Stratificatlon in Comuarative Persuect1ve, ea.JReinhara
Eeoolxaoo-Seymour'Martln -'Lipset-[2ncreu.; New York: The
Free Press, 1966), pp. 47-53·
221bid.

---- ,

p. 47.

23supra , p. 1.
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functional reqUirements are being fulfilled (l.e., that the
system ls functlonlng perfectly), then the Davla-Noore the
ory say s that by offerlng

re~"ards

not provlded by other

posltlons wlth slmilar tralnlng requirements, prepaid group
health plana \'1111 be able to attraot e.pproprlately qualifled
and motivated recruit a.

Alternately, if one assumes that

the system is not functionlng perfeotly, then one would
expeot that inappropriately

t~ained

and motlvated lndlvld

uals would enter prepaid group plens.
However, we need a hypothesis about changes in
reorultment over tlme.

One oan be generated, of course,

provided we can specify how well W'e expect the social sys
tem to function.

Howevel", thls \(ould be difficult, since

the theory provldes no hypotheses about ohanges in the sys
tem's funotloning.

All

lole

kno't'i is that its funotioning is

supposed to be reflected in the supply of recruits to posi
tions.

As a result, any hypothesis about changes in the

funotioning of the system and correspondlng changes in
reorultment patterns would be tautologlcal.

Thua, the

Davia-l>loore theory of stratification falls to provlde the
kind of hypothesis needed in the present study.
Merton and Kltt' a refe!'€mce group theory is nn example
of a social-psyohologloal approach whioh mlght be useful for
generating hypotheses about the kinds of physicians who
enter prepald gl~oup prectlce. 24 One of the propositions in
24aobert K. l-1el"ton and Alice 8. Klt"t II Contributions
to the Theory of Referenoe G:....oup Be~vlor, ~ ~!ud!.es-.!.!L!he

this theory 1s that mob1l1ty 1s dependent upon the 1ndivid
ual's conformity to the norms of the group to Which he hopes
to ga1n admittanco. 25

In other words, mobllity is dependent

upon the lndividual 1 s seleoting the members of this group as

a referenoe group.

In the case of pbys1cl,ans' entranoe into

prepa.id group praotioe, one would expect that physioians ,·,ho
conformed to the norms

or

prepaid group pra.ctice l'1ould. enter

prepaid group plans more frequently than those who dld not
conform.
However, the hypotheses needed for the present study
oonoern variations in reoruitment over time.

In terms of

Merton and Kltt's theory, we need hypotheses about changes
over time 1n the kinds of indi viduale Who seleot prepaid
group practitioners as a reference group.

Unfortunately,

Merton and Kitt are unable to account for the indiv1dual's
seleotion of reference groups.

Therefore, this theory, like

that of Davis and }-1oore, is of limited value in dealil:g with
the problem of this thesiS.

In contrast, Blau I s exchange theory26 provides tho
kinds of hypotheses noeded for this study.

One of the basic

------~----------------------~------

ScoEe _~d Metgod
~erton and Paul

ot "Tpe _Americ~!l

SQla.i~:,·

ed. Robert K.

F. LazarsfeldirGlencoe, Illinois: The Free

Pross, 1950), pp. 40-105.
25!bid., p. g7.

26 0ne of the basic propositions of exohe.nge theory is
that complex social structures and processes cnn be

i i

i
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propositions of exchange theory is that individuals and col
lectivities follol'l the most profitable courses of action.
Profit is defined in terms of the bala.nce between rel1ards
and costs (i.e., resources gained and lost).

Rel'larda can be

of two basic types--extrinsic and intrinsic.

Blau defineB

them as follo't'/s:
A critical analytical distinction is that bet\1Teen as
sociations that are intI'insically re~rarding and those
that furnish extrinsic benefits, which are, in pr1n
ciple, detachable from the association itself • • • •
The basic differonce is between assooiations that are
considered ends-in-themselven' by partiCipants an~7
those they oonsider means for some further ends.
In other '-Tords, to gain a particular intrinsio benefi t, one
must be a member of a particular oolleotivlty; hOl-lever, to
beneti t from a g1 ven ext rio si 0 rel'lard, 1 t do e s not mat tor
what collectivity one is in.

Examples of intrinsiC rennrda

are social acceptance and the fulfillment of the goals ot a
given organization.

Examples of extrinsic rewards are

-------accounted for by simpler proaeIDses, namely those of
exchange. In §xcha.M~~PO!,!£r., Blau def! nes e:slichange as
1'0110,\,113 :

Sooial exchange as here conoeived is limited to
actions thl:lt are oontingent on relul.rdlng reactions
from others and that cease when these expectod
reactlons are not forthcoming (p. 6).
The basic difference betl'Jeen exchange theory and the other
theories "lhich we have consldsl"ed 11es In the partlcular
independent variable emphaslzed. In the Davis-Moore theory
of stratlficatlon 1 t "VlaS the notion of functional prol"equi
sites of a soc'~e.l system; in the Mel~ton-Kitt theory of ref
erence groups it was the individual's expectations or values
held In accord \'lith his reference group. In Blau's exchange
theory it is the balance betiveen re\'1m"ds and costs which a
partlcular course of action would entail.
27Blau, !~ch~~g~~nd Po~er, pp.

35-36.

: I.
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prestige, pOl1er, and money.

The differontial distribution

of extrinsic reT;lsrds defines the status, i. e., position in

a ranking system, of an individual or oollectivity.
Guided by the proposition that individuals and col
lectivities follow the most profitable oourses of action,
Blau develops a number of propositions on mobility and
'recruitment which bear on

OU1~

question of' the kinds of

physioians who enter prepaid group pract1oe.

We will first

discuss propositions on the relationship of extrinsio
rewards to recruitment:
Successful competition provides more resouroes for
rel'Tarding members and thus spells further succcss,
since the greater rewards discourage mombers of the
collectivity from defecting from it to others and
encourage membgers of other colleotivities to leave
them for it. 2
This proposition states necossar.y conditions for 1) an in
crease in the resouroos allocated to recru1tment by a col
1 1

leotivity and 2) the recruitment of new members.

Theoe

•

1

conditions are described as "succossful competition."
I

,I

2SIbiq., p. 332. The render may find himself puzzled
beoause in this proposition and those that follo'l1 Blsu does
not exp11citly state that he is discussing extrinsio rather
than intrinsi c rel'fards. How'ever, if one bears in mind that
extrinsic but not intrinsic re'\'lards are basic elements of
ranking systems, then it is clear that the notion of extrin
sic rather than intrinsic rC\'/arde is implioit in these
propositions. For example, Blsu refers to increases in
rewards. This implies that the value of these rewards sa
1ncentives varies according to their quantity rather than
their quality. HOllever only in the case ot extrinsio
rewards is the size of the re\"lB.rd significant, and only by
virtue of this fact 1s it poosible for this kind of reward
to serve as a basis for ranking systems. Thus, it 1s clear
that Blau 1s talking about extrinsic rather thnn intrinsic
r e~J'.Ilrds •

I

I

.1
I
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The following statement clarities the nature of these
conditions:
Many groups and organizations also oompete for a
domlnant position in the larger social structure,
and sucoess in thls oompetitlon requires a flexlble
internal status structure that permits an organized
collectlvity to attract quallfied co~tributors by
rewarding them with superior status. 9
Here these conditlons are described ln greater detal1 as suo
cess ln the oompetltlon for a dominant pos1tion in the
larger soolal structure.

In other words, successful compe

titlon 1nvolves an 1norease 1n status for a oollectlv1ty.
The previous propositlon oan now be restated as follows:

as

the status of a oollect1v1ty inoreases, the rewards whlch 1t
offers recruits will also 1ncrease.
We turn now to several proposit1ons on the relation
ship ot extr1nsic rewards to mobi11ty:
Membership 1n various colleotivit1es is not equally
reuarding, "Thioh ls one factor that promotes mobility
bet\ieen them. • • • In terms of this factor alone all
individuals have equal 1ncentives to move to the most
rel'lardlng oQllectlvl ty in which thoy cnn find
aooeptanoe.)O
. In other ,\iorae, Blau suggest s tha.t

fOl">

a. gi van individual

mobillty is dependent on his hav1ng the opportun1ty to
receive b1gher reuc.rds.

These

oppol~tunitles 81"6

dependent

on conditions stnted in the following propositlons:
While 1nferlor status in a oollectivity gives mem
bers most r~ason to want to loave it for a.nother,
superior statue in it creates the greatest

29±..£id., p. 292.

30Ibld.
--- , pp. 295-296.

I

opportunities and potentialities for moving into
another collectivity that promises higher rewards •
• • • The middle stratum in a collectivity • • •
tends to oonstitute its solld core of members who
neither have much reason for wanting to leave it
nor much tempting potential for dolng 80.31
In other words, the opportunity to take advantage of higher
rewards depends on the status of the ind1vidual beforo
mobility:

hlgh status gives an lndivldual a greater oppor

tunity than eithor middle or 10''1 status.
propOSition is suggested:

The follo'tfing

opportunities for higher rewards

lead to mobility of high status (rather than low or middle
status) individuals.
The following two propositlons have been derlved from
Blau' B theory of mobility and. recl'ui tment :

1) As the

status 01' a collectlvity increases. the rewards which it
offers recrults will also increase.

2) Opportunities for

hlgher rewards lead to mobility of hlgh status individuals.
With regard to variations over time in the kinds of physi
cians entering prepaid group plans, the follot-ling hypoth
esis is suggested:
As the statue (rank) of prepnid group health plans
increases, the status (rank' of physiclans entering
these plans will increase.
Thls hypothesls msy be further refined by distin
guishing the various criteria, 1.e., achievement and
ascription, Which govern the distl.·lbution of extrinsio
rew'ards:

3l~£!.~.,

pp.

296-297.

I
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As the status (rank) of prepaid group health plana
increases, a) the achieved status of physicians
entering these plans will increase and b) their
ascribed status will increase.
Achieved statusos are those which are obtained by virtue of
behavioral performances, such as competenoe.
prestige, income, and pol-rer.

Examples are

Ascribed statuses are assigned

by virtue of the situation of one's birth:

examples are age,

sex, race, and territorial location. 32
It was stated above that extrinSic rewards are basic
components of ranking systems. 33
incentives for mobility.

I

As suCh, they serve as

In contrast, intrinsic rewards

are not basic elements of ranking systems.

Nevertheless,

they are associated with any given status, i.e., soclal
positlon.

Thus, intrinsic re';'1B.rds may also serve as incen

tives for mobility.
Intrinsic re,...,arda vary in the degree to tihich they
serve as incentives for mobility depending on the exper1·:.··
ence which an individual has had with these rewards in
other positions.

Blau states that:

These expeotations of sooi8.l rel'l'ards, in turn, are
based on the past social experience of individuals.
• • • The study of cxohan go processes in social
assooiations must take into account the ways in
which the values of the rC\1ards being exchanged are
modified by the expectations of the participants
and, ultimately, by the previous dlstrlbij~iOn of
rewards that governs those expectations.'

32Smelser, p. g.

33suEra, p. 16.

34:s1au, ~~~_an~PO't!~.;:, pp. l43-l It1t.

I
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In other words, intrinsic rewards serve as incentives for
mobl1ity dependlng on the stntus (position} of the lndl
vldual.

Accordingly, one might expect that the kinds of

intrinsic rei'lards received in prevlous statuses sffect the
kinds of 1ndlviduals who are mobl1e.
However, before we can specify a hypothesis relatlng
mobility to lntl'insic retutrds, we must consider how 1ntrin
sic rewards lntel'act
mobility.

\11

til extrinsic rCi'iarda ininduc1ng

The problem is that either extrinsic or lntrin

sic rewards, or both, may serve as incentives for mobility
1n any particular situation.

Therefore, it 1s neoessary to

specify the relationship between them.
According to Blau, extrinslc rel'lB.rds are the most
s1gnificant factors affecting mobl1i ty. 35 Jloi~ever, they do
not account for all instances of mobl1lty.
m1ght expect, for

exa~pleJ

Therefore, one

that the entrance of high statue

1ndividuals into a collectivity offering

felT

extrinsio

rewards could be accounted for 1n terms of intrinsic
rewardS, more specifically in terms of the slmilarlty
betl'leen the lntrinslc rei-lards of the indl vidual' B past and
present po sl t 10ns •

Accordlngly, the fo 11ol71ng hypothesls

is suggested!
As the status (rank) of pl~epaid group health plans
increases, hlgh status recl"ults \<1111 less frequently
35Blau, "0ooupatlonal Supply and RecrrJlltment, II
XXX

(1965), p.

l~gg.

~SR,
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oome from statuses (social positions) with intrinsic
rewards similar to thoRe found in prepaid group plans.
Examples of statuses (pooi tions)

\171 th

intrinsic rewarda com

parable to those of prepaid group practice are pract1ce
w1thin an organ1zational setting 1nvolv1ng the centra11za
t10n of facilities and pORitions involving Bcience-or1ented
rather than praotice-oriented activities.
In sum, Blau's exohange theor,y has enabled us to gen
erate the kinds of hypotheses we need regarding variations
1n the k1nds of physicians who have entered prepa1d group
practice.

They are as followa:

1) As the status (rank) of pre~a1d group health plana
1ncreases, the status b'nnk} of physicians entering
these plano will increase.
a) The achieved status of these physicians will
1ncrease.
b) The ascribed status of these pbysicians will

1ncrease.
2) As tho status (rank) of prepaid group health plans

lncreases, high status recruits will less fre
quently oome from statuses (positions) with intrin
ale rewards similar to those found in prepaid group
plans.

CHAPTER II

METH OnOLOGY
I.

SOUROES OF DATA

Two sources ot infonlstion on the kinds ot physioians
who enter prepaid group praotioe are the personnel records

ot physioians employed in the Portland Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan and the A..'.1A I a

~!oan

Medical .D!!.:Qotorl.

As

sources of data tor this study, eaoh haa its advantages end
disadvantages.

The

!1~dioa~ D!r~ct2.!:l

would provide tor a

comparison of physioians entering prepaid group praotioe
with those entering prl vate practioe.

Suoh a design tfoula.

faoi11 tate the int erpretation of findings by alloldng fOl'
controls on some of the faotors \,Ihich might a,ccount tor the
results.
However, there is one serious disadvantage to the
data in the

Medi£~.!._Dire~~~!:y":

it contains only a fet.,

1tems of information on eaoh physician.

In oontrast, the

peraonnel records of Kaiser physioians contain information
on several possible indioators for eaoh of the

variable~

whioh have been mentloned so tar, namely, the status of
Kaiser, the status Of physicians, and their past social
positions.

Therefore, in spite of the fact tha.t the per

sonnel records of Kaiser do not allow a. oomparison or

23
prlvate to prepaid group practitioners, these records were
chosen as a source of data.
II.

DESIGN

The lmpllcatlons of the cholce to use the personnel
records of the Portland Kalser Foundation Health Plan as a
souroe of data are eVldent in the research design of thls
study.

Flrst, although the hypotheses of thls study con

cern all prepald group plans) the data oover only one pre
pald group plan.
case study.
slble.

In other wOI'ds, the design lnvolves a

As a result, no tests of hypotheses are pos

Second, since the data concern only some prepald

group practltloners but no prlvate practitioners, the de
slgn lacks a oontrol group.

As a result, the hypotheses of

this study are only partlally explanatory.

Thlrd, the

kinds of data which can be extracted from the Kalser per
sonnel records are for the most part nomlnal and ordlnal
data.

Thls sets llmltatlons on the methods whlch can be

used to present and analyze the data.
Universe
As stated above, although the hypotheses of this
study refer to the universe of all prepllid group praoti
tioners, the data cover only the uni verBS of physlcians ln
one prepald group health plan.

More specifically, the

unlverse of' the present study includes all physlclans who

24
have praoticed as tUll-time, Eslarled statf in the Portland
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan at any time sinoe World vTar II.
Such physicians are dosignated "active staft" within
Kaiser and are distinguished from the courtesy and consult
ing stafts, as well as the preceptees (residents).

Further

more, they include only physicians who practiced in Kaiser
after it had been opened to the public in

1945, regardless

of whether these physicians entered Kaiser before or after

1945. It does not include physicians who practiced there
exclusively during the war years, 1942-45, when the Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan ""!as :run on a striotly emergenoy,
war-time baeis.

In light of the differenoe between the

oontext tor practioe whioh Kaiser presented during the war
and that "'hioh .1 t represented after the

~;ar,

it seems

likely that the Characteristics of the latter physicians
would bo difforent from those ot the former, who practioed
in KRieer after the war.
Since the uni verse involves only one oase of a pre
paid group health plan and since the data in this case spun
the period of time
the

desl~l

study.

bet~/een

its inception and the present,

of the present research is a longitudinal case

Strictly spealcing, no test s or hypotheses oan be

made in such s study, since a test investigates the extent
to Which an hypothesis holds in all the cases of the uni
verse to whioh the hypothesis reters.

As a result, the

generality or the conclusions which can·:.,be dratm from the
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present study is severely limited.

The similarity between

the Kaiser Health Plan in Portland and other cases of pre
paid group practice will merely be assumed.
Controls
S1noe the universe of the present study conta1ns only
prepaid group practitioners in Kaiser, the researoh design
lacks n control group of private pract1tioners.

Further

more, since the controls which are used refer almost exclu
sively to characteristics of prepaid group

pl~actitioners

rather than private practitioners, the etfects of certain
exogenous factors on the findings of this study cannot be
ruled out.

An example Of such an exogenoae variable is

changes in the composition of the medical profession.

This

variable, rather than changes in the status of Kaiser, may
account for the changing attributes of Kaiser physioians.
However, without a control on this exogenous variable, 1t
would be difficult to rule out its effect.

As long as

important factors remain uncontrolled witb respect to the
r~pothesis

of this study, this study can ooly partially

account for the changing chllracteristlcs 0'1 physicians
enter1ng Kaiser.
The controls used in this etudy involve character1s
tics of prepa1d group practitioners
bearing on their mobility patterns.
chosen aocording to t"10 crj.. ter1e..

~'lbich

5'llght have a

These controls were
The first control, on
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Aotive/inactive staft status, was chosen beoause it was a
mobi11ty variable which, aa suoh, mighthnve an effeot on
the mobility of physicians into Kaiser.
Active-inactive staff status indioates l'Thether a
physioian who entered Kaiser is still practicing there or
Whether he has Since left.

It seems plausible tnat this

. val'lable might be related to the kinds of physicians who
are responsive to the changes in the extrinsio rewards of
Kaiser wh10h presumably accompany changes in Kaiser's
status.

T,.,ro w'ays in ,\i'hich this might oocur are:

1) Inac

tive staff might represent physioians 1'1ho both came to and
lett Kaiser in search of higher extrinsio rewards; active
staff might have remained in Kaiser because of its intrin
eio rel'lards.

2) Active staff may have remained in Kaiser

because of the increasing extrinsic rewards which it prom
ised, whereas inactive staff may have left because of its
unsatisfactory intrinsic rewards.
Other controls used in the present study are achieved
and ascribed status.

They were chosen because theoret

ically they represent t,\ITO aspect s of status, or rank, and
as such, one would expect them to be interdependent.
The first hypothes1.s of this study that
as the status of prepaid group health plans increases,
a) the achieved status of physicians entering these
plans will increase, and b) the ascribed status ot
these physicians will inorease.
is based on tho assumption that the achieved and ascribed
aspects of status co-val'Y.

However, they may be inversely
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related.

In any case, because of the supposed interrela

tion of these variables, controls are necessary.

Accord

ingly, controls on ascribed status were used in the hypoth
esis on the increase in the achieved status of Kaiser
physicians, and conversely, in the hypothesis on their
ascribed status, a oontrol on achieved status lias used.
Due to the small size of the universe of Kaiser
phYSicians (N - l4~), it was practical to place only one
oontrol at a time on any hypothesis.

As a result, the

interrelationships among the independent, dependent, and
more than one control variable could not be determined. With
any degree of stability in the data.

It was also imprac

tical to place any controls on the second hypothesis con
cerning intrinsic rewards.

This hypothesis, involving

three variables, in effect already utilized one control
variable.

The variables "i'lhich could be obtained from the Koiser
personnel records were moetly ordinal and nominal vari
ables.

Aocordingly, methods approprie,te for these kinds of

varlr~bles

,.,ere chosen to present and analyze the data..

Ol'oas-tabulation is uaed to preaent the find.ings tor tho
hypotheses and to introduce controls in the analysiD of the
data.

G-aroma

is used to measure the esnociat1on

ordinal Variables.

J

bet,\,lcen

The way in wh1ch the tables were set up csn best be
expla1ned step-by-step.

The first step was to determ1ne

the direction and t1ming of vll.riatj.ons in the independent
variable, the status of Kaiser.

In other words, the years

which could serve as cutting points had to be determined.
Because of the small size of the universe of Kaiser physi
. cians, the decision was made to look at variations in the
status of Kaiser in terms of

lO~l,

medium and high status

periods, rather than to look at such var1ations year by
year.

Three time periods, rather than two, were chosen to

avoid losing too much information through collapsing.
The second step was to decide on the sampling of
phySicians within these time periods.

As stated in the

hypotheses, the focus of this study is on the changing
ch~racteristics

of physicia.ns "Tho enter Kaiser rather than

on the changing characteristics ot the lthole Kaiser staff.
Therefore, physioians will

b~

sampled according to the year

in which they assumed active-staff status in Kaiser, such
that three samples will result:

physicians who entered .

Kalser during the first, second, and third time periods.
The table setup can nmIT be brietly summarized.

The

independent variable, the status of Kalser, is broken dO\'ln
into low, medium, and high status periods.

The dependent

variable may involve anyone of a variety of characteris
tics

or

phYSicians indicative of either their status or the

intrinsic rewards associated with their past positions.
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Physicians are sorted on both independent and dependent
variablos, e.g., on the status of Kaiser in the year that
the physicians entered Kaisor, end on their achieved status.

III.

INDICATORS

As stated above, the problem of this thesi s 1s to
account for variat10ns over t1me 1n the Itinds of physicians

I

I I

recruited into Kaiser.

The analysis of this problem focuses

I I
I I
I I

both on the status of Kaiser and on the status of physicians
who enter Kaiser, i.e., the proportions of physicians with
h1gh and low status and the proportions coming from posi
tions with intrinsic rewards similar to and different from
those of Kaiser.

Thus, the var1ables for which indicators

are needed are the status of Kaiser, the status of physi
cians, and social positions offering intrinsic rel1ards
similar to those of Kaiser.
Statue of

~hysician!

Indicators for the status or rank of physicians

, I
. I

include indicators for both their" achieved and ascribed
statuses.

Two asoribed statuses of physicians are

nationality and length of practice.

Within the context of

the present study, the country in which a physician's med
1cal school is located serves as an indicator of hie
nationality (i.e., nation of birth), since the former vari
able appes.red to be almost perfectly correlated with the

I
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latter.

Information on location of medical school and

length of practice is reported in the Kaiser personnel
records.
•
One kind of achieved status is prestige •. The present

study includes three indicators for a physioian's prestige:
the prestige of his medical sohool, the prestige of his
hospitals of internship and residency, end the prestige of
his references.
The theory behind the first tl'lO 1ndicators is clearly
stated by Wheeler:
Clearly, an important tie fbetween an organization and
a recruit's later oareer] in the status of the organi
zation in the eyes of the oommuni ty. • • • Thus, ...ThcI'C
ever the indiv1dual's reputation is at stake, bis
past membership identities beoome cr1t1cal referenoa
pOints, quite apart from his spec1fic aocomplishments
01' misdeeds wh1le in the organizat1on. l
This suggests that measures for the prestige of physicians'
medical sohools and
can

~erve

hOGpit~~s

of internship and residency

as indicators for physioians' prestige.

Two different methods ere used in the present study
to secure the necessary rankings of,medical sohools and
hosp1talu.

A group of 1nfonnants was selected to rank

medioal schools.

In theory, this ranking should serve as

an ind10ator for the reputation or prestige of various
medicsl 80110010

";~cthin

the medicsl profession.

lStanton Vfueeler, "The Struoture ot Formally Organ
ized Sooialization Settings," Soo1B.l!~!lti0!L.After Ch1l~~£od:
Two ESf5:A,VS, Ox-ville
Brim, Jr. and Stanton V/heeler
Yorlt:-tclhn \l111ey &: Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 96.

G.

rNa,-,

;1
Following Ford, the ranking of hospitals of intorn
ship and residency is based. on the official AMA rating of
suoh hospitals. 2

Accord1ngly, a high-status hospital is a

major teach1ng hospital, i.e., a major unit in the teaching
program of an affiliated Bchool.

A middle-ntatue hospital

is a minor teaching hospital, wnioh 1s aff1l1ated w1th a
med1cal school but wh1ch is used only to a 11m1ted extent
ln the SChool's teach1ng program.}

All other hoap1talo,

1.e., non-teaohing hosp1tals, are oalled low-status
p1tals.

1100

The data on th1s rating were seoured from the

A:tI.A' s Dlre9t orl of

~E£;:~~~....!!lt ernShiE!!-.!!!£...Re ~id~~,

and the data on physicians' hospitals of internship and
residency and medical sohools came from the personnel rec
oras of Kaiser.

i

The third indicator for a physician' a status is the
prestige of hlos references.

It is based on the assumption

that like past organizational affiliations, references
serve as symbols for an individual's prest:tge in situat10ns
\-lhere more intimate know'ledge of the 1ndividual's past in
unavailable.

In other words, the prest1ge of an individ

ual's reference 1s used as an indicator for the individual's
2Amasa B. F'ord et al. The Doatol" a PersQecti ve:
Pbys1£~!ills Vim:! th~!.r-~~Ie!!.~§:=~!!£-rr:ac!!ce-r Cleveland:
TIiePreas of Case i~e8tern Reserve Uni versi ty, 1967),

pp. 116-11g.

}American Medical Associat1~n, D!.t~cto~~Qf.~n2roved
IntcrnshiQB nnd ResldencieR 1291:6S (Ohicago:-~mer1can
Medicar-Assoc1atIon;-r9orr;-p. -71:

I
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prestige.

Accordingly, in the present study the prestige

of a physician1s references 1s used as an indicator for his
status.
The prestige of a reference was inferred from the
prestige of the orgsnizatj.on with which he was affiliat ed
during the time he knew the physician whom he recommended.
Accordingly, high-status references have affiliations with
medical schools or with major teaching hospitals.

Middle

statuo references are affiliated with minor teaohing hos
pitals.

All other references are designated low-status

referenoes.

The sources of datn relevant to this indicator

were the personnel reoords of Kaiser end the

~ire£!£~y

of

~Ero!ed_In~r~~~!E!~~~Res!£~rrcieB.

Within the oontext of the present study, direot
indioators were lacking for the intrinsic rewards of Kaiser
as well as for the similarity of the intrinsic rew'ards
associated with Kaiser and other positions.

Therefore, the

indicators for physicians l past 90cia1 pOSitions having
intrinsic relfards eimilar to those of Ka,iser are indirect
rather than direct.
Data on the intrinsic rewards of prepaid group prac
tice were found in printed statements
about prepaid group practice.
reuards are the tollo\']ing:

In!\de

by physioiana

Examples of auch intrinsic

the opportunity to practice

r
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more scientifically and the opportunity to further onets
education. 4 These printed statements were used beoause
they involved the peroeptions and vB,lues of physioians con
cerning prepaid group praotice.

As such, they should indi

cate the intrinsic rettards of Kaiser as perceived by
potential Kaiser recruits, given the tollol'ling assumption:
lacking experience With the actual rel'/ards of Kaiser, these
recruits would be likely to evaluate Kaiser in terms of pro
and oon statements made by other physicians about prepaid

group practioe.
Other kinds of intrinsio rewards were identified
which, although they may not be reoognized as such by
physioians, may predispose physioians to enter Kaiser.

It

was assumed. that various aspects of the situa.tion of tho
Kaiser recruit or staff member are intr1nsically

re't~art1irlg.

Examples of suoh intrinsic re\"larda are the opportunity for
more oonvenient acoess to faOilitles,5 the opportunity for

4G• W. Hunter, M.D., "Join1ng, II The Ph.:ls~c:1~1rl

Gro~:Q.1:.~tic~,

ed. Ed,\Y'1n P •. Jordan, lLD~Chicugo:
Year!30ok Publ1shers, Inc., 1958), pp. 41-1i2.

~rhe

5Ryack also recogniz.es the adva.nta.ge of convenient
access to facillties in the s1 tUatlon of the prept~1d g:c."oup
praotit1oner:
There are a number of potential advantages to group
practioe: the poo11ng of the skillS of a number of
speo1alists to serve the spec1al needs of the pa
t1ent; salutary effects of the doctor being subject
to observation by his peers; easy access to the
servioes of specialists at little or no add1t1onal
oosts; lower oosts through pooling of capital
investment; stabilized 1ncome for the dootor as he
shares 1n the total reoeipts of the group; fuller

I

i I

~

,'I

a change, and the opportunity to live in the West.
Positions or sets of positions characterized by
intrinsic

rel~ards

fied in the
Kaiser.

sa~e

similar to those of Kaiser were identi

manner as the above-mentioned rewards of

In light of oertain aspects of the structure or

situation ot these positions, it was assumed that they
offer rewards similar to Kaiser's.

For example, the posi
III

tion of postgraduate student, like that of the Kaiser
physician, provides the intrinsic reward of the opportunity
for more education.

Other examples are listed below (For

more detail on these indicators, see Tablen XVII-XXVI):
Intrinsic Rewards

--9fKafs~-

POSitions Offering
-SimlIir-Re~!

Opportunity for more edu
cation

Postgraduate student
Career involving extensive
training

Opportunity to provide
more sc1entifio cara

Speoialty or scientific society
memberships
Previous position emphas12'ing
scientific rather than c11n
ical aspeots of care

Opportunity for mOl"'e con
venient acoess to
facilities

Career 1n bureaucratic oontext

Opportunity to live in
the West

Medioal school student in the
West

Opportunity for a change

Career of changes in speoialties
Career of chengeo in location
ot practioe
Career of changes 1n aotivities

use of ancillary per-sonnel a~d eqUipment.
Elton Rayack, !:~Qfes81o!}fll ~~mer and Amer!!!Rn Hedlcine: The
Economics of the American Hcdioal Association {meveland:
The-War Id-Pub11 shing Company-,19brr;-p.--I5o.

I'

ill

il

I

i

I
I

!

I

I

I I
,I
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Status of Ka1ser
---------~~~~!!!E~J.._5>..!l~_beh!.nCL.~!!£_In9.i c~!2~.

In the present

study there are t'HO 1ndi cators for the status of Ks1 s.er.
One 1s the ratio of unaccepted applicants to staff posit10n
open1ngs 1n Kaiser.

Another 1s a comparison of the rates

of 1ncrease over time 1n the atar·t1ng salar1es of Ka1ser
spec1a11sts to the rates of 1norease 1n the 1ncomes of
self-omployed phys1cians under sixty-f1ve in the Un1ted
States.
The f1rst 1nd1oator 1s based on the follow1ng assump
t1ons:

1) As the status of a collectiv1ty.1ncreases, the

demand for 1t s job open1ngs \,1111 11kew1se increase.

2) The

demand for these open1ngs 1s reflected 1n the ratio of job
applicat10ns from 1ndividuals who take jobs elsewhere to
job open1ngs.

3) In turn, th1s rat10 1s reflected 1n the

rat10 of d1scont1nued job 1nquir1es to job openings.

S1nce

the Kaiser records on d1scontinued job 1nquiries were
available, it \'las feasible to use the ratio of unaccopt ad
app11cants to staff position open1ngs as an indicator for
the status of Kaiser.
The second indicator is based on Bleu's theory of
mobility nnd recruitment.

According to Blau, changes in

the status of a oollectivity involve changes in the amount
of resources which are used to reward both new and old
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members. 6

Starting salaries, which reflect the a'Dount of

resources allocated to rew'arding nett members, can then
serve as an indicator tor the status of a collectivity.
Therefore, in the present study the rate of increase (or
decrease) in the starting salar1es of Kaiser

physic~.ans

1s

used as an indicator for the status of Ka1aer. 7
Since status refers to a position in a ranking sys
tem, the status of any given collectivity is relative to
the status of private pract1ce as well as to the status ot
other segments of the medicol profession.

Therefore, indi

cators for statue, such as the rate of increase in starting
salaries and the ratio of unaccepted applicants to staff
position openings, should bo expressed in relntive rather
than absolute terms.
However, datn on the demand for the position of pri
vate practitioner, whioh might have been used to stand.ard
ize the data on the demand for positions in Ka.iser,

lv"er~

not available, although data on the income of pr1vate prac
titioners were.

g

Therefore, the present study includes one

6~Era, pp. 16-17.
7Data on the starting salaries of Kaiser physicians
wero sccured from the Financial Division of Kaiser and from
the records of personnel advertisements.
gThe following sources of data on the 1ncomes of pri
vate practitioners were used in the present study: Physi
cians' Enrnln~ and Exrrenses: A Regrint of Articles-Sasea

on--nT1edr£~l ~£of0sIC8T·.~=Qon~Irr~r5:Er~urV~Y- ~-r22Q\oraMI~
Medical ,li";conomics, Ino., 19 OJ; 'l'llesults of Medical

N:-J.:

~2!!.0mi£~ I

:[l"irst Annual Checkup of Physlcians I EconomIc
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absolute and one relat1ve indioator for the status ot
Kaiser.
In stand.ardizing the data on the starting salaries of
Kaiser spec1alists with respect to comparable data on pr1
vate practitioners, 1t would have been desirable to have
data on the beginning incomes of speoialists in privata
.practice.

However, due to the lack of such data, it was

necessary to use data on all private praotitioners under
sixty-five and to assume that '\'lithin the context of the
prescnt study the latter data would be representative of the
tormer data. 9 Accordingly, the second indicator for the
status of Kaiser involved a longitudinal comparison of the
starting salaries of Kaiser specialists to the incomes of all
self-employed physicians under Sixty-five.
----~----------------

..

----------.-------.------

Health, II !1edica!..~c2n~ll~, November 2, 1964, pp. 61-107;
and Elton Rayaok, ~~Of~~sional P<2i'!Q!:_~d A~~icall1ied~Q.ln!.
It should be noted that Rayack had access to unpublished data
from the Quadrennial and Continuing Surveys conduoted by the
Journal ~e~iQ~~.~9Qnomi£~. The data reported in Ehlsic~ansl
~!rninga_~nd EX2eI]s~~ and "Physiciana' Economic HoaltfiTr also
come from those surveys.
9ActuallY, the data on all private practitioners may
be of just as great utility as that on beginning self
employed specialists. Although the absolute size of the
incomes of these t,\,10 gl''Oups of physicians "is undoubted.ly dif
ferent (aee Table XXVIII, Appendix B), the rates of increase
1n their incomes may be the same.
Data relevant to this problem show that the rates of
increase in the income of speCialists as compared. to thnt
of all physicians were not identioal during two different
periods, 1951 to 1959 and 1962 to 1963. During the earlier
period specialists' incomos increased less rapidly than
those of all physicians (at rates of 5.6 per cent and g.5
per cent per year, respectively. In contrast, during the
later period specialists 1 incomes increased more rapidly
than the inccmeo of a.ll phy s1 c~_ans (at rat os of 5.5 per
cent and 3.1 per cent, respectively). Nevertheless, the

The method used to make this oomparison was first to
express the inoome dats in terms of percentage inoreases.
They were then interpI'ctec1 as follol.,S:

If the rate of in

crease in the starting salary of the Kaiser specialist
exoeeded the rate of 1ncrenGo 1n the income of the private
praotlt ~.oner, then 1 t was inferred that the status of Kai
Bel" had increased.

Conversely, if the rate of increase 1n

the private practitioner's income exoeeded the rate of
increase in the Kaiser

salary~

then it was inferred that

the status of Kaiser had decresoed. 10
possibility remains that the difference betWeen the rates
of increase in the inoc~es of beginning pl~siclanB and all
physicians m1ght offset the differencos between epecialiate
and all physicians. Unfortunately, we have no available
data relevant to th1s p050ibility.
The source for the 1951-59 rates mentioned above 1s
~hl.£!..Q.!~ll!!~_~art!.~ng~_~nd_ExE~~S~, pp. 9, itt. The 1962-63
rates are found in Physicians T Economic Health," ll.edl CEll
Economics, November 2, 1964, p. 105.
_..

------

w _ __

lOAnother method could have been used to compare the
data on sta.rting salaries of Kaiser specialists to the data
on incomes of private practitioners. ~he data could havo
been expressed as percentage differences. When the peroent
nge difference between the Kaiser salary and the pr'lvate
practitioner's income decreased (given that when the first
difference was computed, the Kaiser salary was lower than
the private prE.l.ct1tioncr's income),lt would hEl.ve been
inferred that the status ot Ka1ser had incpeased. Conversely,
when the peroentage difference increased, it would have been
lnferrecl tha.t Kaiser's status had de(~reascd.
The difference bet\<1een this alternative and the on;;,
chosen can be quickly grasped \.;hen expressed in symbols.
Let 81, s2, ••• Ci represent the salary of the Kaiser spec1al
1st at RuccesBivc pOints in time. Similarly, let 11, 1~, ..•
i1 represent the income of the priva.te practitioner at the
same points in time. Accoro.ing to the method of comparison
chosen for th1s study) the status of Kaisel" is said to in
crease \'then

>

i2 -. -._11
-"'_

.................

i1
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Given increases and decreases in the statuB of Kaiser
over time, per10dw when the status of Kaiser was low,
middle, and high \vere 1nfel~r'ed on the follorring basis:

The

period when the gap betHcen the rates of iner'ease in the
1ncomes of Kaiser physicians and private pr-act1tloners was

the greatest was des1gnated a per10d of either low or high

status for Kaiser, depending on whether the rata of increase
was hlg,.1.el~ for Kaiser physicians or for private practitioners.

Kat ser

'VIas

said to ha va middle status rlhen the gap

was the smallest.
!2~:t a _.2~2:.!.!:~t _¥!!}2:~~t ~£-K2.LKal..§,~r' s_f:!~ tu~. •

The

data for the first indicator of the status of Kaiser show
ths.t the status of Kaiser hae incl'lce,sed over time.

Ts.ble I

gl ves tht: ratios of unaccepted applicant tJ to staff P:;f:\j, tion

--.--.. .----------.. .

----------------.----.------....------~-

_______

.~b·_"._._,_,_

. """_ . .

...::<,.

given that both 8 and 1 have been steadily increasing Over
time. According to the alternative method, the statu~! of
Kaiser is sald to increase when
11 -

81

>

12 - 82

81
62
given that 11 j.B greater than slTho second method of comparison was not chosen because
It :tnvolves tIH) ltssumption that o,n inorement of, for G.x:ampl{'!,
$1000 in the income of f! prl vt\t e practj.t 10ner '-S equal to a

$1000 raise in the salary of a Kolser spcclallnt. It would
have been inappropriate to make such on Rosumption within the
context of the present study because Kaiser physicians rece-:lve bonuses nnd other fringo benci'i ts. rrhUB, Kaiser 8alt~.ry
data do not reflect the absolute size of the income of tho
Kaiser specialist. As a result, the absolute size of an
increment 1n his oalary is not directly comparable to a.n
equal increment in the lneo~ile of a private practitioner.
For mo~e details on the problems 1nvolved in comparing the 1ncome:s of sB.lnrieil Bnd ~elf-employed physicls.ns,
Bec FaIt cl"mayel"', p. 83 Dnd !..t~~.!.£ians ~_~Ea!:r~1ng~_~!2d
Exnenses
pp. 52-55.
-----,--~,

TABLE I

RATIO OF UNACCEPTED KAISER APPLICANTS TO STAFF OPENINGS, 1943-6g
y

Before
.J:.~
Ratio or Unaccepted
Applicants to
§ tatL9E.eni!28:s': ___

0

e

a

r

-

!2.62

126i

!264-

12§5.

126~

;1;.2,61

,!26g

9

14-

9

17

34-

20

35

8The few Job inquiries from physioians whose specialt1es are not represented
in Kaiser are not included in these data.
Source: The data on whic.h - thrstable Is based are :round in Ap-oendlx A~ue
-source of these data is Kaiser's records of personnel advertisements t1962-6g) and
discontinued job inquirles.(1959-6S).
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openings tor the period 1943-6g.

I I
II I

In spito of some incon

sistencies, the general trend is toward more applicants who
do not accept positions in Kaiser.
elBe~'ihere

(Perhaps they

ta~e

II I

Jobs

'I' I

I!,

or perhaps Kaiser does not want to hire them.)

I

Aooording to the table, it appears that prior to

1962, Kaiser had no Job applicants who dld not accept posi
·tions 1n Kaiser and also no advertised statf
gi ving the ratio of zero found in the table.

op~nings,

I I

thus

•I
I!
! I

Hot'lcver, th1s

statement must be qunlit"led for the follovling reason.

Be

tween 1959 and 1962 Kaiser did receive a fevi discontinued
Job inquiries although it did not plaoe any advertlsnmenta
regarding atatf openings in the; Journals.

Strictly speak

ing, the ratio for this peI'iod 1s infinity rather than zero
(aince the denominator 1s zero).
Oonsidering the data on wldoh this ratio 1s based,
one realizes that the ratio laqke meaning as an 1ndicator
for the status of Kaiser.

However, on the assumption that

I

I

I

the datn from 1959 to 1962 oanbe interpreted in the same
way

data

as the data prior to 1959, then the ratio baaed on tho
p~lor

to 1959 is a meaningful indioator for the statue

of KaiM)r during the \'lhole per10d prior to 1962.
The ratiO of unaooepted job applioants to job open
ings before 1959 1s zero.

On the basis of oonversations

with Kaiser personnel responsible for reoord-keeping, it
seems safe to assume that before 1959 .1ob inquiries 't>lere
reoeived only ft'om those physic1ans \-!ho lEtter aocopted

,I
I

i
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positions 1n Kaiser, whereas none were received from physi
cians \';ho eventually accepted Jobs elseuhere.

On the sarna

baaie, it can be assumed that no personnel advertisements
Welle made prior to 1962.

Thus, we can conclude that prior

to 1959 there were no app11cants for stafr positions other
than those who eventually became active staff and also no
staff' position openings.

The ratio of unaccepted job appli

cants to job openings before 1959 1s then zero.

Therefore,

although the ratio of discontinued Job inquiries to Job open
ings for 1959-62 1s actually infinity, it seems appropriate
to express the ratio covering all the years prior to 1962 as
zero.
Having found that the ratios of unaccepted applioants
to staff openings have been 1ncreasing over time, we have
conoluded that the status of Kaiser haa also been inoreas
ing.

However, there are two other possible interpretations

of these data whioh must be discussed.
According to the first interpretation, one could argue
that the trend in job inquiries refleots ohnngcs in Kaiser's
methods of recrUitment.

It appears likely that in the past

Kaiser may have exchanged letters only \'lith physioians

\,,rho

were kno:·m to be seriously interested. in a posltlon in
kaiser and to whom Kaiser was Willing to offer Jobs.

Fur

thermore, in the past interested phYSicians iV'ere probably
discovered differently.

'l'hey may have been friends or

aoquainta.nces of Kaleel' physicians or frlendn of friends,

etc.

This 1'IOulcl provide an opportunity for an lnltlal

informal expression of interest in recruitment and employ
ment.

Written communication may have begun later and served

only to formalize informally mqde decisions.
However, in 1962 Kaiser begPJl to place personnel ac'!ver
t1sementa 1n the medical journals.

Physicians unfamiliar

with Kaiaer or its staff were thus given the opportunity to
write and find out job details.

This chango in recruitment

methods ",ould then explain why Kaiser began to

l~ecei ve

job

inquiries only recently.
Although this interpretation of the

d~ta

on job inqui

ries seems plausible, it is not supported by the data.

It

cannot account for the inquiries receivea bet'tleen 1959 and

1962 before any ads were run in the journals.
A seoond possiblo interpretation of the data on job
inquiries is thnt in the profession as a whole, increasing
numbers of physicians have been taking salaried positions .11
Accordingly, the morefroquent job 1nquiries into pOSitions
in Kaiser

refl~)ct

the widespread grm'ling demand for posi

tions not only in prepaid group health plans but also in
government, industry, public health,eto.
Unfortunately, we lack dnta relevant to this interpre
tation and therefore osnnot reject it.

As a result, the data

on job inquiries do not provide an unamb1guous ind1cator for
llRayack, p.

46.

44
the increasing atatus of Kaiser.

A comparison of the salary

of tho Kaiser physician to the income of the private practi
tioner will.

At the very least, such a comparison should

make it possible to decide \'lhether or not to reJ ect the
interpretation which stressos changes in the medical profes
aion aa a whole.
Data on Second Indicator for Kaiser's Status.
-----------"----------------"----

The

second indicstor for the status of Kaiser is a comparison of
the rate of increase in the starting salaries of Kaiser spo
clalista to the rate of lncrense in the incomes of self
employed physicians under sixty-f1 ve.

As stated earlier, 1 t

involves a comparison of the incomes of Kaieer physicians to
those of private praotitioners in order to assure that the
indicator reflects the relative status of Kaiser.

However,

comparable data on beginning speoialists in private practice
could not be seourod .

Thus, a pot ential source of error

''ISS

intr01uced into this indioator.
Additional sources of error were introduced by various
difficulties encountered in the Kaiser sta.rting sa.lary data.
The first shortooming of these data is that it 113 not olear
whether they are mean or median data, or neither.
to various Kaiser· officials, the salaries

0:[

Aooording

phYSicians in

Kaiser vary only by specialty and by Amerioan Speoialty
Board Oertification.

The salary

dat~

provided by the Finan

oial Division are consistent \-lith this polnt ofvlew.

Hm1

ever, during thG ds.ta-gatllex'lng stage of research, a variety

of evidence was revealed indicating that the salaries of
Kaiser physicians aleo vary according to other factors, e.g.,
a physician's prior experience practicing.

Therefore, it is

necessary to question the representativeness of these data.
Fortunately, it was possible to cross-check the offi
cial data with data from another source, the records of per
sonnel advertisements plaoed in medical journals.

Although

the data from the ads cover only the period from 1962 to
1969, a number of comparisons are possible.
Part II for more details.)

(See Appendix E,

There appears to be a c10so cor

respondence bet\,1oen the two eet a of' data in the CEl.se of four
speoialties--internal medicine, pediatrics, radiology, and
orthopedio surgery.

In the case of obstetrics-gynecology,

the ofticis.1 data gl ve lower rntes than the data from the ads,
whereas in the case of general surgery, the opposite is true.
Data tor four other speCialties were too scant for comparison.
The high degree of oorrespondence between these two
sets of data facl'litateE their interpretation.

It seems

reasonable to a.ssume that the data in the ads approximate the
median salaries Qf the various Kaiser specialists:

most phy

sicians in a given speCialty are probably hired at the adver
tised rate for that specis.lty, although some may be given
more and othere leas.

It also seems reasonable to equate

the official data ",ith that in the ads bee.nuse of the high
degree of agl"ecment found betw'een them.

Therefore, we can

interpret the mora comprehensive off1oial date, ao representing
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the median salaries of the vnrlous Kaiser specialists.
The second eho:rtcGmlng of' the starting salary data. on
Kaiser physioianG is that its oompleteness varlea betueen
speoialties.

Data for specialties uhlch 11eI'e not repre

sented at Kaiser until recently, such as urology, psychiatry,
and otolaryngology, do not begin until the 1960's.

In con

trast, data on pediatrics as well as three other speoialties
begin in the late 1940 l s.
Although this dlfficul ty might have been dealt 1'li th by
estimating the size of the missing salaries, this procedure
was not follolTsd since the ratios between the salaries at
different speoialties and bet'Neen the sa.laries of different
yeare fluotuated too wildly over time.

As a result, it waR

not possible to compute the average starting salary of the
Kaiser physician over time from the date. on the stro"ting sal
aries of the var10us Kaiserspecia11sts.
In -plaoe of data on the average starting salary of the
Kaiser physician, fairly comprehens1ve data on the starting
salaries of' one group of' specialists were used.

The spe

cialists in this group have 1dontical salary schedules.

They

inolude internists, surgeons, obstetrioian-gynecologists, and
pediatricians (Il>1-GS-OBG-PD)

t

and they reoc1 va the 1m-lest

salaries of all Kaiser physicians.
This

pl~ocedurc

of using data on the salaries of one

group of Kaisel" specialists ra.ther than data on the salaries
of all specialists may seem highly unsatisfactory.

However,
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taking into consideration the distribution of Kaiser physi
cicans by specialty, one sees that it may be ,V'orkablo (Table
II).

Since seventy-one per oent 01' the physicians at Kaisel

in 1969 and an even

high(~r

percentage in earlier years were

either internists, surgeons, obstetrician-gynecologists, or
pediatricians, the data on their salaries are representative
of the salaries ot most Kaiser physioians.

In fact

J

had data on the median starting salary of the Kaiser

if we
phys~.~·

cian, it would probably be the salary of a. physician coming
from this group of specialists.
Therefore, in spite of the shortcomings in the salary
data whioh were Just outlined, the data on the starting sal
aries of the IM-GS-OBG-PD group of Kaiser specialists \'lill
be interpreted to be representative of the median starting
salary of the Kaiser physician.

However, the possibility

must be noted that this assumption ma.y lead to errors in the
use of the salary data as an indicator for changes in the
status of Kaiser.
TabJ.e III compares the rates of increase in incomo pel"
year for self-employed physicians under sixty-five nnd for
the IM-GS-IBG-PD group of Kainer specialists (thooe most
represen'l;;ative of all

Ka.1~er

physicians).

Around 'the begin

ning of the 1950's,we find that the incomes of private
practitioners were rising much more rapidly than the sal
a.ries of Kaiser physicians.
physicians

beg.~m

Over the next ten years Kaiser

to catch up \"ith the private practit10ners

TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF KAIBER PHYSICIANS BY SPECIALTY, 1969
(Per cent)

1M,

GS

OB~PDa

R
ORab

7176

A, NS'd

~~!:-

TOTAL
---

6%

16%

100%

--

Kaiser

?!:lB1oi8~

OTO,
OPR 0

7%
N _ 96

-

8Internal modicine, general surgery, obetetrlos
gynecology, pediatrics.
bRadiology. orthopedio Burgery.
°Oto1aryngology, ophthalmology.
dAnestheslo10gy t neurological surgery t ul'ology t gen
eral practice.
-----~,

-------------" - - ---------

but then slipped behind again.

Ho\~ever,

we find that by the

1960's the rate of increase 1n Kaiser salaries exceeds the
rate of inorease 1n private practitioners' incomes.

In

other warde, it appears that over the twenty-year period
from 1945 to 1965, Kaiser ocoupied a 101'1', then middle, and
finally high status posi t~.on .12
12S1nce data on the beginning incomes of self-employed
speCialists l'lere not used 1,n this study, our conclusion that
the statue of Kaiser has increased rema.1ns tentative. Never
theless, consider how our conclusions would be modified 1t
we were using data on self-employed specialists instead of
data on all self-employed physicians. Whereas from 1951 to
1959 the incomes of specialists in pr1vate practice 1ncreased
at the rate of 5.6 per cent per year (soe n. 9), from 19~'9
to 1959 the starting salaries of Kaiser specialiats increased
at a rate of only 3.0 per cont per year. Similarly, from

TABLE III
LONGITUDINAL COMPARISON OF RATES OF INOREASE PER YEAR IN INOOMES OF
ONE GROUP OF KAISER SPEOIALISTS (IM-GS-OEG-PD) AND OF
SELF-EMPLOYED PHYSICIANS UNDER 6S a

(Per cent)

Period

1949-53
1953-56
1956-59
1959-62
"1962-65
~he

Rate ot Increase per
Year in Salaries or
Kaiser S:Qecia11sta

5.7%
3·7
3·3
7.7
10.3

Rate ot Inorease per
Year in Inoomes of Se1f
Pe!:!od

EmE.+..Q.led Ph-y_s1c1_ana

19 47-S1

12.g%

1951-55

S·5

1955-59

9

1959-62

3.3

1962-64

g.5

....

~

data on wh10h this table 1s based are :round 1n Table XXXI, Append1x B.

g
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Having determined the d3.rcctlon of change in the statue
of, Kaiser over the years) \lJe must nm1 decide lfnich years
mark the boundaries betl-Toen Kaiser IS
status periods.
i~orease

101.'1,

middle, and h1r.h

Although the data on the relative rate ot

in Kaiser salaries seemed sufficiently accurate for

the purpose ot determining "mether or not the status ot
Kaiser had inoreased in the long run, it does not tollow
that they would aid in

det~rmining

the general trend oocurred.

exactly when sh1fts in

Therefore, the timing of these

shifts will be determined not only on the baSis of the data
on relative increases presented above but also on the basis

ot the data showing absolute increases in the starting sal
aries of Kaiser specialists over time (Figure 1).
Figure 1 is a graph of the starting salaries of three
groups of Kaiser specialists, the

IM-~S-OBG-PD

group, a

group which includes radiologists and orthapedic surgeons

(R-ORS), and the

otolal~yngologlsts

(OTO).

It includes all

specialties for whioh there are enough data to reveal

---_._-----------------,-
1962 to 1963 the inoomes of the former increased 5.5 per
cent per year, While botween 1961 and 1963 the salaries of

the latter inoreased 4.0 per cent per year.
The conclusion that the status of Kaiser has inc~cased
is still supported though leas dramatically so: although the
rate of inorease in Kaiser salaries never exoeeds that of the
incomes of self-employed opoolaliats, Kaiser appears to be
slol'lly closing the gap beti'leen its salaries and those ot
speCialists in private practice. Unfortunately, we ca.nnot
make similar comparisons bett/cen the incomes of beginning
physiCians in private practioe and in Kaiser. Thus, there is
no way to oetel'mine the dir'sct1on of any error ..ihleh may
reside in our findings ao a result of this 1,aek. of data on
the incomes of beginning physioians.

51
Starting
salaryB.

I

$30,000
2S,OOO

I

-~~---~ ---------~----------,-

!

26,000
24,000
22,000
20,000
19,OOO
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
62 64

----..-- ...

66

6S 70

-~----------------------------

Fi~re

1. Graph of starting salaries of three
groups of Kaiser specia.lists over time.

aThese starting salaries are reported at the board
certified levelj subtract $1,200 for nonbOl~rd level.
Source: Data on the IM-GS-OBG-PD aoo OTO groups of
Kaiser specialists come from an official starting salary
schedule. The salaries of the R-ORS ~~oU? represent a com
bina.tion of data fl'Om. the official startirng salal'Y -schedule
and from records of personnel advertisements (For details,
see Appendix B, Part II).

--------------------------------------------,'i
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changing trends.

One major shift in the trend tot'lard higher

It occurs l)etneon 1963 and 1964

salaries is revealed here.

and marks the beginning of a period of sharply increasing
salaries.

Similarly, the data on the relative rates of

increase 1n these salarios show one marked change 1n the
trend toward hlgher salaries (Table III).

HOtf'ever, it seems

to occur batt-Icen 1959 and 1960, rather than between 1963 and
1961~.

In both sets of data

$.

minor shift appears to occur

between 1953 and 1954.
By relying more heavily on the absolute salary data
. than on the relet! va sals.,ry data, the follo-uing breakdoHn
•

for the status of Ka1ser was defined:

The period when the

status of Kaisel"' was low runs froOl 1943 through 1953 and
thus includes a number of years (1943-47) for which no sal

ary. data were available.

It is assumed that the variations

in salaries during these early years are consistent with the
data available in the later years of this time period.

The

second period, t'lhen Kaiser occupied a middle status posi
tion, covers the years from 1954 through 1963.

Finally, the

period of Kaiser's high status runs from 1964 through 1969.
Although this breakdovm may not be the only ono which
can be derived fI'om the salary data, Table IV indicates that
it 1s a valid one.

This table presents a rough comparison

of the rate of increase in income per year of Kaiser spe
cialists and nll private practitioners for the three time
periods defined above.

Tha data reveal that dur1ng the

TABLE IV
>'

OOMFARISON OF RATES OF INCREASE FER YEAR 'IN INCOMES OF ONE GROUP
OF KAISER SPECIALISTS (IM-GS-OBG-PD) AND OF SELF-m~PLOYED
PHYSICIANS UNDER 65 DURING SELECTED PERIODS OF TIMEs
(Per oent)
Rate of Increase
per Year 1n Sa1ar1es of
Ka1ser S~e~1a11sts

Period

~

19 49-53
1953-62

5.7%
5.6

1962-65

10.3

Per10d

Rate Of Inorease per
Year 1n Inoomes of Self
__ Em~oled Physic1ans

1947-51

12.S%

. 1951-62

7·2
g.5

1962-64

aThe data on wh10h th1s table 1s based are found 1n Table XXXI, Appendix B.
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:

1

first period Kaiser salaries were 1ncreasing at a much
slot'ler rate than the incomea of private practitioners.

In

1

:/

1

markedly.

:

I

the second per10d the gap between the rates decreased

1

: I

1

1

I

Finally, in thel th1rd period Kai-ser salaries were
1

:11

1ncreasing more rapidly thEm tbe incomes of p:;:'! vate practl-

It

I

q
'I

I

II

I

I:!

I

I

1

I

tioners.

We conclude thatl the status of Kaiser has 1n
1

creased from low to high dux'i ng the following three periods:
1

19 43-53, 1954-63, and ~96~-69.
I

We have now examined all the data on the second lndi
1

cator for th~ status of K~iser.
\

As 1n the caoe of the first

I
I I
, I

indicator, we found ~hat ~he status of Kaiser has increased
over _time.

However, although
e(;u"'11er
,
,

\'ie

1

were unable to

1

rejeot the alternative interpretation that the data merely

I I

I

reflected trends in the

m~d1ca1

I

profession as a whole, we

1

can now do

60

on the basis
of the data on the relative rates
,
I

of increase 1n Kaiser aalaries.
: I
I
I

I

i

1

,I

I,

CHAPTER III
FINDINGS:

STATUS OF DOCTORS

ENTF~ING

KAISER

This chapter contains the findings for the first
hypothesis of this study.

Since the data, which include a

variety of. indicators and oontrols, 1n most cases do not
support the hypothesis, the hypothesis must be rejeoted.
HOl-leVer, beoause of l'leaknesses in the data and design

ot

this study, all conclusions are tentative.
The first hypotheeis of this study states that:
As the status (rank) of Ka1 ear lncl"eas6s, the statuu
(rank) of phySicians entering Kaiser ,"111 inor'easo.
It was further refined by dlstinguishing bet\'/een tl'10 com
ponents of the dependent variable, the aohieved and asoribed
aspects of status, ana

r.estate~

as follows:

As the status of Kaiser increases, a) the achieved
status of physioians entering Kalser will inorease
B.nd b) the ascribed etatu8 of these physicians wl1l
increase.
-The disoussion of this ohapter will begln wlth the f1ndlngs
lvh10h relate to the achleved status of phystclans

Kalser.
their

Luter

aso~1bed

i-Ie

enter~.ng

1'1111 disouss the findlngs relating to

status.

I.

DATA ON HYPOTHESI S ONE \ffiEN ACHIEVED

STATUS IS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Throe different indicators tor physicians' achieved
status were Ilsed:

prestige of medical school, prestige of

references, and prestige of hosp1tals of 1nternship a.nti
residency.
. indicator.

\'/e w111 st!u·t with the data involvlng the first
These findtngs are of particular importance

inasmuch as data for the Whole universe of Kaiser physiCians
were available only for this indicator of achieved status
but not for the other two.
First Ind1oator for' Achieved Status
rlnd~ngs.

Oontrary to our hypothesized expectations,

the data (Table V) show that as the stHtus of Kaiser has
increased, the percentage of high status physicians

ent0~

ing Ka1 ser has decreased and the percentage of 1mi' sta.tus
phys1cians has inoreased.

In other words,

8.S

the sta.tue of

Kalser increased, the status of physicians (mtering
decreased.

K~d.oer

Although a direot relationship lias hypoths8ized

betw'oen these two variD.bles. the findings show that they sre
inversely related to some degree.
strength of associat10n betueen
which ind1cat as ths.t there l

B

Gamma,

tl'lO

D.

measure of the

variables, 1s -0.163,

a relv.tiveJ.y \'-leM nugst iva

association betwoen the status of Kaiser and the status ot
physicians who have entJred Ke.1s6r over time.
Extraneous Unoont
011ed
Variables.
----_..-._._--_
- ----- . . ·--,
_----_.,_.-----_.
... ......

those findingd

~.s

.......

......

not clsti:.l'-·cu.t.

~Phey

Interpretation of

Appear to be

TABLE V
PP.ESTIGE OF PHYSICIANS' MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIilLE OF ENTRY IN'ro KAISER

(Per oent)
Period and Status of Kalser
Medical

-

Sohoo1

1943-53

(LO~T Status)

1954-63

i.H1~!atus)

46%
54

52%

39%
61

Loti

High
Total
Number

1964-69

(Mld£le Status)

100
Ll-1

100
2g

4g

100

7'9

gamma = -0.163

\J'I
-.J

contrary to theory.

HOlveVC1',

this conclusion can be stated

only tentatively since the design of this study includes
nei ther a control gl'OUp of prl vate practi tioners nor

8.

con

trol on changes in the composition of the medical profession
as a tlhole.

Thus, it ls possible that the f1ndlng of a

decrease in the status of KaiEer physioians might be the
effect of changes ln the oomposition of the medlcal profes
sion as a whole.
For lnstance, over the past t\,lenty-flve years the per
centage of physicians grad.uating from lot'l prestlge medical
schools may have lncreased. relAtlve to the percentage corning
from high prestige schools.

In other l'lOrdB, the distr'ibu

tion of medlcal studonto among high and loY status schools
may have changed.

If such a change has occurred, then it

would be likely that prepaid group practltloners as well as
prl vato praotltioners n011 more frequently come from 10"-'
status schools than they dld in the past.
Another klnd of change in the composltlon of the medi
cal professlon 'might also have influenced. the findings of
this study.

Reyack argues that relati va to the demand for

mcdice.l serVices, the size of the medical profession has
been decreasing. l Aocording to him, the rcsulti~g shortage
of pl'.yslciana has led, for instance, to lncreases ln the

II
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.1
I,

i

recruitment of interns, residents, and graduates of foreign
medical schools by hospitals.

'l'h1s shortage could conoeiv

ably lead as well to changes in the distribution of high and
lmi status graduates among the various sectors of the medi
cal profess1on.

For example, perhaps the percentage of

I

phys1cians from low status medical schools entering both

I

pr1vate and prepa1d group pract1ce has 1ncreased relative to
the percentage go1ng 1nto research or teaching.
How'ever, if we could eliminate the effect of this vari
able (the composit1on of the medical profession) from our

II

II I

find1ngs, we might find that the status of physicians enter
ing Ka1ser has 1ncreased.

I

Suppose we could eliminate tho

i

I

effect of changes in the distribution of medical students
among high and

10Tll

status sohools.

We then might find that
! i

the ratio_of low status graduates entering Kaiser to the

I

i

total numbor of low status graduates had decreased over time.
We would conclude that the status of Ka1ser recruits had
increased 'over time.
Similarly, suppose we could

el~mlnate

the effect of

changes in the distr1bution of high and low status graduates
among various seotol's of the medioal profession.

~le

I
•I

might

I

find that the proportion of low status graduates among all

•I

phys1cians entering Kaiser had inoreased less rapidly than
the proportion of low status graduates among all physicians
entering private specialty practioe.

Again we would conclude

that the status of Kaiser recruits had inoreased over t1me.

I

I

.I
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In addition to the composition of the medical profes
sion, there is one other extraneous uncontrolled variable
which may have an effeot on the findings of this study,
namely, changes in the reoruitment policy of Kaiser.

A num

ber of such ohanges appear to have occurred over the years:
1) an incrasse in the range of specialt1es represented by

Kaiser physicians, 2) expansion of existing speCialty
groups, 3) variations in the size of the preccptorship (resi
dency) program, and 4) the first employment of general prac
titionel"s (GP' 6) in the emergency room of Bess Kaiser Hos
pital in 1969.
Each of these

~~anges

could conceivably have contrib

uted to the increasing percentage of low status physicians
entering Kaiser. 2 In fact, the last chango appeers to havo
had such an effect:

five of the seven GP's (seventy-one

per cent) graduated from low prestige medictd schools,
whereas les8 than forty-eight per cent of the specia11sts
entering Kaiser from 1964 to 1969 graduated from such schools.
In other words, the propo!'tion of low status GF's enter1.ng
Kaiser is much higher than the proportion of low status
2For instance, the '1ncref.l:3e in the range of specialty
services could have led to an inorease in recruitment from
Kaiser's courtesy and consulting staffs. The physicians who
had formerly provided spocie.lty oare :for Kaiser patients on a
part-time baeis 't'lOuld ha~je been given full-t1me, active staff
positions. As s result, the percentage of phYSicians enter
ing Kaiser who were already a part of the Portland medical
communi ty "lOule} probably have 1ncreased. This could. concei v
ably have led to an increase in the reoruitment of physicians
from the Uni verstty of Orogon, a 101'1 prestige sohool.

I

I
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specia11sts.
Furthermore, four of the seven GP's graduated from the
Unlverslty of Oregon Medical School, a school with low pres
t1ge.

Th1s flgure becomes more s1gniflcant when we reallze

that all exoept one of the GP's (the exoeptlon was a former
preoeptee at Kaiser) had some connection with the Universlty
of Oregon as a medlcal student, lntern, or resldent.

To the

extent that the Unlversity serves as the lilain source of GP
recrultment, lt ls likely that the status of GP's recrulted
will be affected.

To the extent that taklng the

eme~gency

room positlon 10 compatlble with concur-rent meGlcal tralnlng,
the near-by Unlversi ty of Ol"egon Medlcal School ls likely to
continue to be a source for at leD-st some of the recruits for
the positlon of emergency room GP.
As the dl saussion of 'GP reerul tment

abO~'6,

cha.nges in

recruitment policy may lead to changes ln the status of phy
slcians entering Kalser.

If we could control thls factor, we

mlght find that tho hypotheslzed relation be:tueen the status
of Kaiser and the status of' lts recruits llOOld emerge.

For

lnstance, if we made a long! tudlnal comparls,on of the status
only of those recruits from special ties lfhleh he.va been
represented at Kaiser slnce 1943, we might tind that the
status ot.-these physioians had inoreased over tlme.

Unfor

tunately, without a more comprehensive indlcator for changes
ln recruitment policy, there ls no way to place a oontrol on
this variable.
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Since we have no controls for these two seemingly

i:1

~

'I

important extraneous VB.l'lables, thi 8 study ca.n provide only
a tentative interpretation of the finding that as the status
of

K~iser

has 1ncreased, the status of physicians entering

Kaiser has decreased.

However, other important extraneous

variables can be controlled.
Oontrols.

Four controls were placed on hypothesis one.

Following a brief introduction of these controls and our
expeotations concerning them, the relevant data will be
presented.
The first control was in-etate/out-of-state location
of med1cal Bchool.

Since there 1s only one

~~-approved

medical school 1.n Oregon, in-state schools refer exclusively
to the Uni versity of Orl3gon Medical School in Portla.nd.

Out

of-state schools refer to all other schools of Kaiser re
cru1ts.

I

I
. I

This control, unlike the others, was not introduced

on theoret1cal grounds; 1t \'1as not part of the original
research design.

Rather, 1t

118S

introduced later dur1ng the

analysis of the data on the hunch that it m1ght be inter

I

I

related with the status of physiCians entering Kaiser.

I

The second and third controla introduced into the rela.
tionship between the status of Kaiser and the achieved status
of ita recrulto were nationality and length of previous prac
tice, two types of ascribed atatus.

The indicator for

nationality WaS the foreign versus domestic location of phy
sicians' medica.l schools.

A U. 8. school ind1cates high

!

I

ascribed status, and a foreign school lnd1cctes low ascribed
status.

Similal"ly, in the case of. length of previous pra.c

tice, one or more years' experience in practice is presumed
to indicate a higher ascribed status than no experience in
practice.
Achievement and ascription represent two criteria
according to l'lhich the extrinsic re'VTaI'ds defining an indi vid
ual's status, or rank, are distributed.

In other words,

status, or rank, is made up of two interdependent factors,
achieved and ascribed status.

Since achieved and ascribed

status are interdependent, controls on ascr1bed status were
introduoed into tho relationship bet't;lcen the status of Kaiser
and the achieved status of its recruits.
Active/inactive staff status was the fourth and final
oontrol plaoed on hypotllesis one.

Active/inactive staff

status, i. e., whether a physician remains in Kaiser or leavec
to go elseWhere, represents the same kind of mobilIty factor
as a physician's entranoe into Kaiser.

Accordingly, one

would expeot them to bo interdependent in some way.

F'urther

more, as suggested earlier,; one would expect that the intro
duotion of this control would refine the original relation
ship bctl'/een the status of Kai sel' and the status of it 6
recruits by revealing its limiting oonditions, such that the
original hypothesis would hold true only among aotive or
only among inactive staff.

3~upr~, p. 26.
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The 1ntroduction of the first control into the rela

I:Ii
"

"

tionship between the status of Kaiser nnd the status of itD
recruits resulted in the f1nd,ings presented in Tables VI and
VII.

These findings Dhow that the original inverse relation

ship found between the status of Kaiser and the status of its
recruits remains
ates.

a~ong

both in-atste and out-of-state gradu

Table VI reveals that among physicians from out-of

state medical schools, the original relationship remains
although it is

mu~~

weaker.

It involves a shift of only

four percentage points as compared to a shift of thirteen in
the original correlation.

From Table VII lt is evident that

recrultment from the 10\-1 status Unlversity of Oregon ha.s
steadlly lncreased over the years.

In sum, we find that tho

percentage of lm'i status phYSiCian£! frc1m both In-sto.te and
out-of-state medlcal schools has increased over time.
In order to clarify the nature of the interrelationship
among the status of Kaiser, the status of its recrUits, and
the location of their medical schools, one can ask whether
the control factor serves to ref1ne, expand, or explain the
original correlation.

These alternative. lnterrelationships

which independent, dependent, and control vnriables may take
are defined by Zeiael as follows: !t Refinement involves tho
1ntroduction of a. third factor into a correlation auch that

Iil

TABLE VI
PRESTIGE OF MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER AMONG
PHYSICIANS FROM OUT-OF-STATE MEDICAL SCHOOLS
(Per cent)
Per10d and.. Status of Ka1ser
Pr~stlge

ot

Mcd1cal.SchQ.o1

1954-63

1943-53

-

H1gh
Total

Number

41%

39%
61

37%
63

Low

1964-69

(Hi~Status)

(M1ddle Ststull

(Lo,"r Status)

59

100

100

100

27

36

64

------...---------------...

...-----------------'

------------------------~--------------.----------------------------~

TABLE VII

PHYSICIANS FROM IN-STATE MEDICAL SCHOOLS BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER
Period
-

1943-53

(Low Status)

and Status of Ka1ser

----

1954-63

1964-69

{M1ddle~tatus)

(H~h

Status)

Physic1ans from
In-State
}ljed1csl Sohools

-----------

15

5

1

-----------------------------------------

------------.---------------

,

~

_,~-------.'7~--~------

______ ~

____

~~~--

0'\
\.11
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the or1ginal relationship is changed under the ne'., condi
tions of the third factor. 5 ExpEtnsion involves the intl"o
duct ion of third factors which "have an independent influ
ence upon the factor considered as the 'effect' in the
original correlation ll but which do not mod1fy the original
relationship.

6

Explanation involves the introduction of

,third factors llhich are not only correlat ad with the effect
in the original relation but "also l"elat ed to the factor
considered as causal in the ol~iginal correlation. 8 7 In nci
thel" refinement nor expansion is the third factor related to
the causal factor in the original relation.
Applying these distinctions to the data in Tables VI
and VII, we find that introducing the oontrol on location of
medical sohool does not refine the original correlation: the

I I
I
I

original inverse relationship bet'i>lCen the status of Kaiser
and the statue of its recruits remains among both out-of
state and in-state reoruits.
Table VIII presento data on the relationship bet'''een
the independent and control variables, the status of Kaiser
and the locat1on of reol'uito' medical schools.
abIes are only slightly correlated:
percentage pOints is involved.

The tl'lO vari

a shift of only fifteen

Since the correlation is

small, the third factor does not explain the original

...

5Ibld., pp. 199, 190.

--

7Ibid., pp. 190-191.

BO

TABLE VIII

LOCATION OF PHYSICIANS' MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER
(Per cent)

Per10d and Status of
Location of
Medical School

-

Out -of-stat e
In-state
Total

Number

19q.3-53

iLow Status)

1954-63

l.Mldd1e

K~~

StatusL

1964-69

(H1gh Status)

96%

gg%

gl%

4

12

19

100

100

100

p-g

41

79

0"\

-.J

relationship.

g

Instead"

med1cal school 10catiol1 expa.nds the

or1ginal hypothesis, exerting an independent influence on
the dependent variable, the status of phys10ians enter1ng

I,j

Kaiser.
Although this control on location of a phys1cian ' s
medical sohool t'1as not introduoed on theoretical grounds, 1 t
proved to be important within the context of the present
study.

Should this variable then be incorporated into

future hypotheses about the mobility of phYSicians into pre
paid group
hypotheses?

practice~

Should it be used 1n tests of suoh

It should not be, 1f its importance in the

present study represents the exception rather than the rule.
The medical school situation of Oregon is atypical, there
being only one AMA-npproved medical school, which ha.s low
status.

Therefore, one \'10uld expect the significance of

this control to be l1mited to the situation of the Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan 1n Oregon.
Nationality, one type of ascribed status, was the sec
ond control introduced 1nto the relationship between the
gWhether a control variable serves to expand or
explain a l'elatlonship depends on themagnitude of the cor
relation bet't'Tcen independent and oontrol variables. The
ideal case of explanation ,.,0uld be characterized by a per
fect corralation betimen these variables; the ideal oase of
expanston "lOuld involve 8.. zero correlation. Thus, the weak
oorrelation found between the status of Kaiser and the 1n
state/out-of-state location of recruits l medical schools
indicates that, atr! ctly apea1r.ing, the contI'ol variable nei
ther cAple.ins nor expands the origins.l correlation. HOliever,
recognizing that the distinction betl1een expansion and
explanation 1s releti va, cne l170uld describe the effect of
this control varia,ble a3 expansion rather than explanation.

,I

I

II

status of Kalser and the achleved status of physiclans
entering Kaiaer.

Ii

Table IX ahows that among recrults from

I

I,

I

II,

I

:,'11 I

U. S. medical sohools (l.e., recrulta with hlgh ascribed

I I
I

status), the orlglnal lnverse relatlons...ltip between the.

I I

status of Kalser and 'the achieved status of its recruits

: I

remalns, although it 1s sllghtly weaker.
relationship does not appear to hold

In contrast, the

a~ong

recruits from

foreign schools (who have low ascrlbed status).

The aohleved

status of the latter physlo1ans seems first to lncrease and
then to decrease.
I I

However. because of the small number of cases of
fore1gn graduates (N = 24), the percentage figures may be
mlsleading.

If we dlsregard the flgures for the flrst time

period Which are based on only two cases, then we find that
the trend bett-leen the second and th1rd periods is consi st ent
with the orig1nal correlation:

~~

the achieved status of for

elgn physicians entering Kaiser has decreased.
Another way to look at the data on foreign graduates

II
, I

I!
"

1s to use the total number of foreign graduates as the per
centa,ge be,se rather than the total entering Kalser in any
given tir:,e period.

This serves to elim1nnte the effects of

variations ln the total number of
status

recru~.ts

IO~1

and high achieved

to enter Ku1sa!' in any given time period.

When this method of percentaging i8 uEled (Table X), we see
tbat the poroentage of fore1gn graduates l'lith low achieved
status entering Kaiser has iner'ee.eed

mOl'C

rfJ.pldly than the

I

I

TABLE IX

PRESTIGE OF PHYSICIANS' MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY
INTO KAISER AND ~ATIONALITY
(Per cent)

1943-53

!.Low Status)

Prestige or
Medical School
,

Fore~@.

100.0%
0.0

Low
High

-U.S.
-

34 .6%
65.4-

1954-63

(Mldd:l;e Ste.tusl
Fo!:eim

U.S.

Number

100

100

2

26

For~

U.S.
-

50.0~

45.7f.,

75.0%

46.0%

50.0

54.3

25.0

5!t.O

--Total

1964-69

(High Status)

100
6

-------

--

100

lOa

35

16

,

-100
63

...-----.~-----

-.J

o

TABLE X
PRESTIGE OF MED!CAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER
AMONG,PHYSICI;~S OF FOREIGN BIRTH
'
(Per oent)
Perl?d and
Prest1ge of'
lw1ed1cal Sohool

1954-63

1943-53

(Middle Status)

tLOl( St~!us)

Low

4%

H1gh

o

13%
13
N

-----------------------------

Sta~~of_Kaiser

1964-69

(High Statu&

52%
19

=23
--------------------------------------------

......
t-t

....,="':"",~_

1 ..,-..... /
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percentage of foreign graduates with high achieved status.
It the small number' of foreign gra<1uates is taken into
account, it seems reasonable to conclude that among fore1gn
graduates, as among U. S. graduates (i.e., graduates with
both high and

101'1

ascribed status), the ach1eved statu.a of

physicians entering Kaiser has docreased, l"/hile the status
of Kaiser has increased.

Thus, since the orig1.nal correla

tion continues to hold among both U. S. and foreign medical
school graduates, it is not refined by the introduction of
thls control on ascribed status.
Table XI shot'1s that as the status of Kalael' inoreases,
the percentage of physicians entering Kaiser from foreign
medioal sohools inoreases, ",hI1e the percentage fl'om U. B.
sohools decreases.

HOl-feVer, since these two variables are

only slightly correlated, the oontrol on natlonallty oannot
be said to explain the original relatlonship bettfeen the
status of Kalser and the status of its recruits.

Rathert

this control on ascribed status appears to have an indepen
dent effeot on the dependent va.riable, the achieved status of
physicians entering Kaiser.
The third control placed on the first hypothesls was
length of previous practice, which represents another type of
ascribed status (Table XII).

Thi s control refines the orlgi

nal hypothesis by revealing one of its limiting oonditions.
Among physiclans who have not engaged in practioe before com
ing to Kaiser "'rho have low asoribed status), the

TABLE XI
NATIONALITY BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER
(Per oent)
Period and Status ot Kaiser

I
c.-'J

---«

:.t'"
-4
r<''1

Nationa11ty
Foreign

1954-63

1943-53

(Middle Status)

(Lalor Status)

7%

15%
S5

93

U. S.

e:;

1964-69

(High Status)
20%

go

, :;:..:!
~

r;:;
~;,J
j

e"

~
E::

Total
Number

100

100

100

2g

41

79

C1I:II

:=.J

5;
-C

gamma

=-0.327

......,
\.H

TABLE XII
PRESTIGE OF

PHYSICI~~S' MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO
KAISER AND LENGTH OF PREVIOUS pa~CTICE

(Per cent)

Prest1ge of
Medical Schoe1

1954-63
(M1dd1e_ St a tUG )_

1943-53

(Ltj..!'1~tatus)

_

o

Yr.

~~ct:t£!

o

1 +Yr.
Practice

Y!'.

Practioe

1+ Yr.
Practice

-----

1964-69
_tR1gh Status)

o Yr.

Practice

----

1+ Yr.

Practice

Lo,'l

44%

44%

54%

43%

65%

45~

Hl&-'1

56

56

46

57

35

55

100

100

100

100

100

100

9

9

11

30

26

53

Total
Number

n.B.

= 10

-.r

.:=

II'

I
I
II'
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relationship between the status of Kaiser and the aohieved

II,
II';

I

,I:;

status at its recruits is strengthened, although it d1s

II,

appears among physicians Who have practiced one or more

I

years (who have high ascribed status).
As hypothes1zed, both controls on ascribed statuG

:1
I

I
I

(nat1onality Eind

l~ne;th

of pruv10ns pre,ctlce) are inter

related with physicians' ach1eved status.

In the case of

length of prev10us practice, \vhen a recruit lacks this kind
of ascr'bed status, the likelihood of his reoru1tment varies
over time with his achieved fltatus.

However, when the

recruit has this kind of ascribed status, the likelihood of
his reoruitment does not vary over time depending on his
achieved status--1n all three time periods he io s11ghtly
more likely to enter Kaiser if he has high achieved status
than if he has low achieved status.

In other words, the

introduction of this third factor ref1nes the original
relationship bet\<leen the status of K!:lisel" and the achieved
status of its recruits by revealing one of its limiting
conditione.
In the case of nationa11ty, the relationship among the
varia.bles is different.

Over time, ,,,hether a physician hae

low or high ascribed status (i.e., foreIgn or U. S. national
ity), the likelihood of his recruitment depends on his
achieved status.

The third factor of nationality has an

independent effect on the dependent vBriable of achieved
status in tho orig1nal relationship.

,76
Tho active/inactive staff status of physicians who
have entered Kaiser is the fourth control vrhich was placed
on hypothe sis one.

'llhi s control serves to refine the

original inverse correlation found between the status of
Kaiser and the status of its reoruits.

Table XIII shows

that whereas this inverse relationsh1p is strengthened
. among active staff, it disappears among inactive staff.
ThUS, as hypothesized, this control refines the original
l'elntionship by reviealing one of its lim! tlng condi tiona:
Among active staff, but not among inactive staff, the
status of physioians entering Kaiser decreases

8S

the

status of Kaiser 1ncreases.
QonclusiQ!!!..

A major part of the flr.::llngs for the

first hypotheSiS has no'" been summarlz,a.d.

In these find

lngs prest1ge of medical school 1s uced

an ind1cator for

a physician's achieved status.

88

With one exception they nrc

based on the whole universe of physicians l-ibo have prac
ticed in Ke.iser since 1tlorld War II.
Contrary to expectation, the findings do not support
the hypotheSiS that as tho status of Kf:'l.ls61' increa.sed, the
achieved status of physicie.ns entering KaJ.ser sleo
increased.

Instea.d, it has been found that as the status ot

Kaiser increased, the e.chieved status of its recruits de
creased.

In other ,,'ords, these v8.rie.bles e.re inversely

rather than directly related.

TABLE XIII
PRESTIGE OF PHYSICIANS' MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO
KAISER AND ACTIVE/INACTIVE STAFF STATUS
(Per cent)

1943-53

_ _(!:!ow StatueLPrestige or
Medical Sohool

Aotive

---

Inaotive

Lo't'1

25%

42:&

High

75

.,k2!

100

100

g

19

Total
Number

1954-63

(l-11ddle Status)
Active

---

Inactive
--

36%
614-

67%

100
2g

33
100
12

1964-69

---tHig!LStatu~

Active

53%
47
100
60

Inactl~_

47%
53
100
19

----

-J

-..t

---------! I

~

The tour controls placed on this hypothesis also sup
port the negativo findings.

'I:

The introduction of two of the

controls, length of practice and active/inactive staff·
status, led to the refinement of the orIgInal inverse rela
tion between the status of Ksi.ser and the achieved status

ot its recruits by revealing its 11miting conditions.

In

'other words, the original relation held only among active
starf and physiclans wlth no

plj>oVlOUB

experience practlclng

I·

but not among lnacti ve staff
rlence.

s.I~d

physiclcms with suoh expe

The other tt"O, natione.lity and In-state/out-of

state locatIon of med.ical school J were
independent effect on the achieved
enterIng Kais er.

fo~nd

statu~

to have an

I

I
I

I
, I

of physicians

among both foreIgn and U. S. physl clans and among both in
state and out-of-state graduat.es.
tent~tlve

potentlally important extraneous
controlled.

for two reasons.

variabl~s

First,

could not be

Second, indicators used may be weak.

There

fore, although it is posslble :that further evidence would not
alter the conclusions "lhich r!e hAve dravTn from our data, 1 t
is also posslble that such

ev~dence

would lead to other

lnterpretatlons of the data.
If additional evldence provlding for more controls
were available, then any of the folloynng alternatlve lnter
pretatlons of our data'might 'be callee. for.

Flrst, if all

important extraneous variables could have been controlled,

I

;

"

In other·wol'aS, the origInal relation held

These flndlngs are

I

II
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the hypothesized relationship bett'Jeen the status of Kaiser
and the status of its recruits might have been revealed.
In this case, we would have found that the status of Kaiser
physicians had in fact increased as the status of Kaiser
increased.
ported.

Our first hypothesis would then have been sup

Second, more adequate controls might have led to

the explanation of the unexpecteq, relationship l'lhich was
found between the statua of Kaiser and the status of 1ts
reoruits.
~en1ng

In this case, We would have discovered nn inter

variable between the independent end dependent vari

ables of

OUt'

hypothesis.

hypothes1s aocordingly.

We

would then have mod1fied our

Thir<.l, suoh oontrols might have

revealed the spurious nature of the unexpected relationship
which was found betlV'een the status of Kaiser and the statua
of its reoruits.

In this oase, 'We ",ould bave found a con;;;

trol variable which account ad for both the stetus of Ka,1 ear
and the status of its reoruits.

As a reoult, it would have

been neoessary to reject our hypothesis.
If bettcu' ind1cators for the achieved status of physi
cians were avatlable, the findings might support the first
hypothesis.

This possibility will be disoussed below fol

lowing the presentation of findings using indicators other
than the prestige of

B.

physician IS medioal school.

Second Indicator for Achieved status

_______

_

_ _ _ _1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

The seoond indicator for a physiciants aohieved status
used in the present study was the prestige of his referenoes.

, I

go

Unfortuna tely, due to p!'ooleme of missing information, the
findings using these ind.icator-s do not apply to the whole
universe of Kaiser physicians.

(For more detail on these

problems, see Appendix 0.)
Flnding~.

Table XIV shows that the status of physi

cians entering Kaiser has inoreased as the status of Kaiser
'has increased.

In oontrast to the data where prestige of

medical school serves as an indioator for achieved status,
these findings confirm our hypotheSi s.

In other \-/orde,

these data reveal a direct, rather than an inverse, rela
tionship bet":een the status of Kaiser and the status of it B
recruits.

Furthermore, the association is strong; gamma is

0.554.
Because of the large number of cases for which data on
references were missing, a high degree ot confidence cannot
be placed. in this finding.

There are t'Kenty-nlne cases miss

ing, twenty from the earliest time period J 19 43-53, and nine
from the period 1954-63.

Since the period 1943-53 contains

data on only eight cases, the poesibility arises that they
may not be representative of all the physicians who entered
Kaiser at that time.
The following data suggest that, in tact, the findings
tor the time period 1943-53 are not representa,tlve.

The

accompanying diagram (Figure 2) shows the prestige of the
medical schools of all' physicians who entered K8.1ser during

1943-53, accord1.ng to "1hother or not they are still

TABLE XIV
PRESTIGE OF PHYSICIANS' REFERENCES BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER
'(Per cent)
Period and Status of Kaiser
Prestige of
References

Low

1954-63

1943-53

1964-69

(Lm.; S'tatus)

(Middle Status)

(High Status)

100%

'+'1-,~

I,"

2Z'h

Medium

0

31

High

0

25

35
4-3

100

100

100

~

32

79

Total

Nu.rnber

n.s.

== 29

gamma :=. 0

.554

--------------------,-------------------------------"--------------

<».

I-'

2g physioians entered Kaiser,

20 left

10 lett

10 lett

before

after 1952

1952

7

have
high prestige
med. schoola

3

have

low prestige
med. schools

------------_._---_.

1943-53

g stayed

6 have high
prestige med.
schools

4 have'
high prestige
med. schools

2 have low
prestige med.
schools

6 have
low prestige
med. schools

.--------_._-----------------------------

~re 2.

Distribution of cohort of physicians entering Kaiser during
active/inaotive staff status, year of reSignation, and pres
tige of med1cal school.
19~3=5;-Oy

~~

00.

I'\)

!

I

practicing in Kai oer and if nO,t, according to whether they
left Kaiser before or after 1952.

Estimating that data are

missing fOl" all physicians who left Kaiser before 1952,

I
I
: !!

three-quarters of those who left after 1952, and one-quarter
of those \vho did not leave (see Appendix C), then one seeG
I

that the prestige of the medical sobools of physicians for
whom data are missing i8 higher than that of physioians for
If the two indicators, prestige ot

whom data are present.

references and prestige of medical achool, are correlated to
some extent, then it is likely that the 1943-53 data in

If

Table XIV are biased in favor of low status recruits.

I
, I

the1943-53 data are biased, then finding en increase in the
II

status of physicians enterinG Kaieer over time is probably an
artifact of the unrepresentativeness of the data which uee
prestige of references assn indica.tor for the status of
physicians entering Kaiser.

II!

Extranf;ou8 Unoontrolled Variables.

----------~-------

..

'lbe finding of a

direot relationship between the status of Kaiser and the
status of its recruits (when indicated by the prestige .of

I

their references) may be mlEllead.ing because the generali tx of
this relationship may be limited.

As discussed earlier,9

physicians who have been affiliated with the University of
i

Oregon Medical School at one or more points in their' careers
have been enterlng Kaiser in greater numbers:.

control on Uni vorsi ty

of

!

I

ThUS, if a

Oregon ref-erances 'Versus other

9SUDr8, Table VII, p. 65, and pc 61.

--"'--

I

I

!

---------------------,-----."...-..,......-~~-----------------,

references were placed on the fir!st hypothesi s, then it io
likely that we would find the folilowing:

1) Among physi

cians wi th non-Uni versi ty ot' Oregon references there has
been a decrease in t he statuE of iphysl cians ent ering Ka1 ser.
2) The frequency of phy sicians w1 th Uni verst ty of Oregon
1

references, i.e., high status ret1erences (by virtue of their
medi cal school aff11iati on) has ilncreased over time.

If a

direct relationship bet\'1een the sltatus of Kaiser and the
status of its recruits is found only among physicians with
University of Oregon references, ithen the generality of this
relationship is severely limited..

I

Consequently, it would

not lead us to question the val.iq,ity of the inverse relaI

tionship found earlier \'lhen prestige of medical school was
I

the indicator for a physician's status.
!

Third Indicator for AchievedStatuB
Find1!!g!.

The third indicator for a physician's

achieved status used in the pres$nt study WBS the prestige
of his hospitals of internship

a~d

residency.

Using this

indicator, we find that the firs; hypothesis is supported
(Table XV):

as the sta.tus of Katser increases, the etatus
!

of its recruits also increases. ,(The correlation is fairly
strong; gamma
missing.

= O.3g2.)

Data for only fourteen cases are

Although eleven of them come f:r'om the first t1.me
i

period, data on seventeen cases are present for this period.
Thus, although the accuracy of the previous findings which
i

use prestige of references as an indicator seems highly

!

I

TABLE XV
PRESTIGE OF PHYSICIANS' HOSPITALS OF INTERNSHIP AND
RESIDENCY BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO r~ISER
(Per cent)

Period and Status ot Kaiser
Prestige ot Hospi
tals ot Internship
_ and Re'pi~ncLLOW

M.edium
High

1954-63

1943-53

!.Low Statusl

(Middle Status)

1964-69

(High Statu!U.

53%
41

lS%
40

48

6

42

43

9%

--..

Total

100

100

100

Number

17

40

77

n.a.

== 14

gamma == 0.3S2

--------------------------------------------------------c:».

\J1

g6
questionable, there are ftvlfjJr Y.'eas,:ms to doubt the aocuracy
of the present findings.
,A Valid Ind;'ca!2,r'l
representative of the

Asm.u1l1ng that these findings are

unlvo~se 01'

Kaiser physicians, then it

1s necessary to account for the discrepanoy found between
these findings and those whel~e pl"est:tge of medical school
serves as an indicator for the achieved status of physicians.
Perhaps it arose beoause one of the indicators for achieved
status is better than the other, or perhaps neither indica
tor is adequatG by it self.

We will discuss these two pos

sibilities below.
The di screpancy bet"J'een these two sets of find.ings may
have arisen because the indicators

prestig~

of medical

school and prestige of hosp! tale of internship B.nd residency
are inversely correlated.

It'

flO,

physicians from

10ir1

pres

tige medical schools t'lould have high prestige hospitals of
1nter~ship

and residency.

after exporl encing
(i.e.

t

up'~~ard

They would have entered Kaiser
mobility dur1ng their training

each stage of tra1n1.ng "!tlas taken at a more presti

gious center of learning).
tapping similar

a~pects

Although each indicatox' 'Would be

of status, neither would be adequate

by itself as an indicator for the achieved status of physi
cians ent er1ng Kaiser.

Therefore, thoy "Tould have to be

combined to form an 1ndex of status.
The d1 screpancy betlieen the two sets of find1ngs might
also have arisen because the indicators for achieved status

were not oorrelll:Gcd.

If

th~A

wel"e the caee, then it liould

be possible that one indicator for achieved status is bet
ter -than the other in the cant ext of physicians t job oppor
tunities.
As suggested by soverRl informants, the prestige of a
phys1c1an's medical school may not be an 1mportant factor 1n
.physicians' Job opportunities.

Instea.d, as one 1nformant

ola1med, the prostige of the speo1alty program 1n wh1ch a
physio1an receives his residenoy' training as 'vell as the
prestige of the spec1alist

unde~

whom he studies during hi.s

res1dency may be more 1mportant.
1ndioator used in the

pres~nt

In this case, even tho

dtudy, the prest1ge of hospi

tals of lnt ernsh1p and residenoY', l'lOUld not be a sufficiently
sens1tive ind1catol' of a. recruit's status because it leads
to a ranking of hospitals rather than of programs and pro
fessors ,1ithin hosp1tals.

Unfontunately, it is beyond. the

soope of the present study to answer these questions regard
ing the va11dity of various indicators for achieved status.
Nevertheless, the questions must be kept 1n mind in inter
preting the results of this
~~!~l

of Data on

st~dy.

Achieve~ St~t~~_~f-PhlB1cl~~!

In sum, the findings'tor the first variant of the first
hypothes1s--as the statu8(>f Kaiser 1ncreases, the achieved
status of physicians enter1ng
concluei va.

K~18er

The reasons are d,. 'Verse:

will 1ncrease--are not
1) Da.ta on the "Thole

universe of Kaiser phy sic1~ns '-lero available for only one

gg
indicator of achlevea status.

contradictory

l~esults.

2) Different indicators yielded

3) Important extraneous variables

could not be controlled.
-Although it can be definitely concluc1ed that the
status of Kaiser- 1s aS6oci8.ted

wj

th the status of physicians

enter1ng Kaiser, the direction of the relationship 1s uncer-

tain.

When prestlgo of medical schools serves

cator for achieved ete,tuB,

lie

8S

find that the status of phy-

eicial1B entering Kaiser has deol"eased over time..
when prestige

of~-:110BpitalH

of

sn indi-

lntern~hlp

!n

cont!~::~et,

and residency' is th::

indicator, we find that their status has incroased, sa
A
hy ~1'"
.l",V "'-1'-\Osl'>J
l.J -,1,('"
L;I e \..:..

Thus, we cann.ot deflni tely rejeot -this

hypot h {:; 81 s •

As hypothesized, national! ty, length of

previoul'~)

pr'ac-

tics. and active/inactive staff status W9re found to be
important controls with respeot to the fix-at hypothesis"
The impor'G8.nca of the In-state/out-of-sta,te location (.'))"

medical sohool was discovered during the analyais of tho
data..

Nationality and the in-state/out-ot-state locatio!: of

a reoruit's medical school were found to have an independent
effect on the aohieved status of physicians entering Kaiser.
Length of previ.ous practice and act1 ve/lnact1 ve steff ete,tUG
refined the original inverse correlation found between the
status of Kaiser and the status of its recruits.
The detailed f1nc1111gH wh1ch use prestige of medical.
school, of hospitals of lntel"'nship

aDI} resl(1,en(~y,

and. of

S9
referenoes as indicators for the achieved status of physlcians entering Kaiser are listed below:
1. As the status of Kaiser increased over time, the
prestige of the medical schools of physicians entering Kaiser deoreased.
R.
Controls on nationality (as an indioator for
ascribed status) and on the in-state/out-ot-state location
ot a recruit's medical school had an independent effect on
the prestige of 1'1e(n'auits' medical schools. In other words,
among both fore1gn and domest1c physicians and among both
in-state and out-or-state ~Taduate8, the achieved status of
physicians entel'alng Kaiser decrea.sed over time.

b. Controls on both active/inactive staff status
and length of previous practice (as an indicator for ascribed
status) refined the inverse correlation between the status of
Kaiser and the status of its reoruits by revealing its limiting conditions. In other vlOl~ds, the relat10nship held only
among aotive staff and among physicians who had no previous
experience practic1ng.

2. As the status of Kaiser increased over time, the
prestige of the references of physicians entering Kaiser
increased. (The va11dity of these findings 1s doubtful.)

3. As the status of Ka1ser increased over time, the
prestige of the hospitals of internsh1p and residency of
physicians entering Kaiser increased.
II.

DATA ON HYPOl'HESIS ONE ~~EN ASCRIBED
STATUS IS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The second variant of the first hypothesis states th&t:
As the status of Kaiser increases, the ascribed status
of physicians entering Kaiser will increase.
The following two indicators for ascribed status were used in
the present study:

tice.

nationality and length of previous prac-

As stated earlier, foreign nationa11 ty indicates

status; U. S • nationality indicates h1gh status.

101';

Slmilal-'ly,

the lack of any exper1ence 1n practice indioates low status;

90
one or more years experience indicates high statue.

We wlll

begin our discussion of the ascribed otatus of physicians

entering Kaiser with the findings which use the first
indicator.
"

First Indicator for Ascribed Status

-------~-----------~---

The findings in Table XI, ,,'hen nationa11 ty l8 the

indicator for ascribed statu8 1 are opposite to those hypothesized:

as the status of Kaiser has 1ncreased, the percent-

age of physicians with high ascribed status (U. S. natlonali ty) enter-lng Kaiser haH decreased \4]1111e the peroentage l-;ith

low asoribed status (foreign rmtlonallty) has increased.

In

other words, as the status of Kaiser has increased, the
ascribed status of physic1ans entering Kaiser has decreased
(gamma

=-0.327).

Instead of a direct relatlonshlp as

hypothesized, we find an inverse relationship between the
status of Kaiser and the status of its

recr~its.

Without proper controls, the conclusion tha.t the
asoribed status of Kaiser recruits has deoreased is tentative.' Data found in Rayack illustrate how critioal a con-

trol on the changing compos1 tlon of the roedl,cal pl"ofesslon is
for the interpretation of data involving graduates of foreign
medical schools:
The impact of immigration 1s also shown in medical
licensure data. Between 1940 [1950] an~ 1959 fore1.gh graduates recei ving 11 censure as a pel"centage
of the total licenses granted ;'08e from 5.1 to

91

19.7, almost a fourfold increase. lO
In the present study data on the percentage increase in foreign graduates \';ho became specialists in pri vate prHctloe

would be needed in order to conclude definitely that

t~e

twofold

1ncrea8e~

between

1943 and 1963 represents a decrease 1n the status of

1n foreign graduates enter1ng Kaiser

Kaiser recru1 t s.
Se~n(1_I~9:1 c?-tor .L~E_Ascrl !?£d .~.!~ tu 8

Table XVI reveals an lncon 81 st ant correla.t ion batt-Teen
th~ status of Kaiser and the ascribed status of its recruits

as measured. by length of previous practice (gamma

= 0 .OB9) •

Although the ascribed status of physicians entering

KalseI~

deoreases between the second and th1rd time periods, it
increases between the firat and second per10ds _

(No pl"evl-

ous practice indicates low status; one or more years of
practioe indicates high sta.tus.)

The accuracy of this finding must be questioned.

Since

data are missing for ten cases in the first time period, this
period 1ncludes data on only eight een cases.

HOl'leVer, th1s

problem can be dealt with by introducing a control on aotive!

inactive staff status.

This will allow us to isolate the ten

missing cases among inaotive staff; the data on active staff
lORayack, p. 123~ The data on which this statement
was baaed {p. 12r~) reveal that 1 t is in error. Rayack should
he"ve been descr1b1ng the perlod from 1959 to 1959 rather than
the period 19 40-59-

TABLE XVI
LENTGH OF PREVIOUS PRACTICE BY TIME OF ENTRl: INTO KAISER

(Per oent)
Per10d and status
Prev10us
Practice

1943-53

1954-63

or

(M1ddle status)

(Low statUB)

Ka1ser

1964-69

(High Sta tus )

o Xr.

5C~

27%

33%

1 or More Yr.

50

73

67

j

1
.",~"~.,,,~

·-~otai

Number

. ·100-

J.OO

100

41

·79

19
n.B..
gamma :

= 10
o. og9

""
N
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will then be complete.

11

Table XVII shows that the introduction of a control on
active/inactive staff statue reveals the interrelation between the statue of Kaiser and the ascribed status of its
reoruits.

Among active staff, as the status of Kaiser has

1ncreased, the ascribed status of its recruits has decreased.
HOl'lever, among inscti ve staff, the rela.tionship betl'leen

Kaiser's status and the ascribed status of physicians enterlng Kaiser is inconsistent, as it was 1n the original correlation befor'e the control

't~ElS

lntroduced( Table XVI).

Again, the findings fa.iI to support the fir-st hypoth-

esis.

Among active staff, the status of Kaiser and the

ascr1bed status of its recruits (as measured by length of
previoua practice) are
related.

L1ke't~lse,

invel~8ely rc;:~thel~ than

directly

in the previous findings where natlonal-

1 ty served as an indicatol' for a.scribed status, these vari-

ables were inversely related.
Summ'§El-.2L~at~__ p'n Ascrlb~S!_~!atus

.2f

Phl!!.!~.!~n9

Contrary to expectation, we have found that as tho
status of Ka.isel"!

incl~eased,

the ascribed status of physic1ans

llActually one case 1s still missing from the active
staff data. Comparison of the nmaber of cases miss1ng from
Table XVI and Table XVII OhOliS that whereas 10 cases are
missing from Table XVI, 12 cases are miss1ng from Table
XVII. As intended, the introduction of the control on
active/inactive staff status allowed us to 1solate the 10
cases originally miss1.ng from Table XVI. In Table XVII
these cases appear in the data on inactive staff but not in
the data on active staff. However, 1n the process two
additional CBses turnod up missing. Since one of these is

TABLE XVII
LENGTH OF PREVIOUS PRACTICE B7l TIME OF ENTR7l INTO KAISER

AND ACTIVE/INACTI.VE STAFF STATUS

(Per cent)

191+3-5;

Previous
Practice

Active

. . J:2%-.

o :tr.
1 or More Yr.

Total
Humber

Inactive

..

1964-69

1954-6;
.c M1d.dle status)

(r..,Ol'T status)

Active
..

~%

25%

gS

11

100

-100

75

g

9

-

(H1gh Status)

Inactive

-

Active
;a~

33%
67

....Jt~

5S

70

-

100

100

100

?S

12

60

n.a.

Inact1ve

-

100

19

= 12

'I.D

.f:."
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entering Kaiser decreased.

The detailed findings are listed

belo",!:
1. As the status of Kaiser has increased, the per
centage of domestic recruits (\<lho! he.ve high ascribed status)
has deoreased, while the percentage of foreign recruits (,~o
have lOti asoribed status) bas increased.
2. Among active staff, as the status of Kaiser has
inoreased, the peroentage of Kataer reoruits who have been
in praot1ce one or more years (i.e., who have high asor1bed
status) has decrensed, \'lhile the percentage of physiCians
who have never been in practice (i.e., who have low ascribed
status) has increased.
III.

5UMlwIARY:

HYPOTHESIS ONE

Earlier, in summarizing the 1'1 rst part cf the findings
on hypothesis onf; (in \vhich the dependent variable is the
achieved status of physicians entering Ka15er)

t

the findings were inconsistent and. inconclusi vee

we notod that
\fuen pres

tige of medical school lias used as an indicator for achieved
status, an inverse relationship wa.s founcl between thG status
of Kai ser and the status of its recru1 ts.

HO\oJever, when

prestige of hospitals of 1nternship and residency was used,
a. direot relationship was found.
In oontrast, the findings on the second part of hypoth
esis one Cw·/here asoribed status is the depp,ndent varlablc)
are constat ent.

They shOl'T that

~e

the status of Kai Ber haa

inoreased, the ascl'1 bed status of physiCians enter1ng Kaiser
has deOl'eased.

In other l'1ords, these variables appear to be

missing from the data on active staff, these data are not
quite complete.

I,
inversely rather than directly related.

On the whole, a

variety of eVidence has been presented supporting the con
clusion that the status of physicians entering Kaiser haa
decrea.sed l'lhile the status of Kaieer has increased.

Thi e

includes data wnich use three di vcr'se indicators for the
status of physlciano:

prestlge ot medical school (llThich was

based on an informant ranking), nationality, and length ot
practice.

It alao includes data where four different oon

trols B.r-e placed on the first hypothesis.
In contrast, there is llttl'e evidence showing that the
statuB of physicians entering Kaiser has increased.

It

lnvolvea t"to indicators for otatus, prestige of references
and prestige of hospitals of internship
lire essentially

simil~~r

~nd

residency, which

in that they are both based on the

AMA rating of teaching hospitals.
~fuereas

the findings

~~lnst

the first hypothesis aro

based on three diverse indicators for status, the f1ndings
for the first hypothesis are based on only one kind ot
indicator.

In other words) the former set of data is more

heterogeneous than tho latter set of data.

Therefore, it

appears that the first hypothesis of this study should be
rejected..

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS:

POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY DOCTORS

PRIOR TO ENTERING KAISER
In this chapter data on the second hypothesis of this
study will be presented and discussed.

We will discover

that there are slightly more findings against this hypoth
esis th.9.n for it and that there is no discernab1 e pat tern to
the pos1tive and negative findings.

As a result, we w1.11

find it difficult to dravl any general conclusions about the
Circumstances, if any, under which this hypothesis is suc
cessful.

It will also 'be difficult to dra\1 any definite

conclusions as to why the find1ngs are so highly inconsis
tent.

Perhaps some of the indicators were pOOT; perhaps it

would have helped to use controls.

In the last section of

this chapter, we w111 discuss each of these conjeotures.
The second hypothesi s of this study is as follot'iS:
As the status (ranle) of Kaie,er increases, high otatus
recruits will less frequently come from statuses
(posit1ons) with intrinsio rsw8.rds similar to those
found in Kaiser.
Indicators were needed for the stntus of Kaiser, the status
of physicians, and positions offering intrinsic rewards
similar to those found in Kaiser.

The indicators for the

9S
status of Kaiser have alreaCly been discussed. l

Prestlge of

medical school ",as chosen as an indicator for the sta.tus of
physicians instead of prestige of references or prestige of
hospitals of internship and residency.

As discussed

earlier, the data on the first indicator are more completo
than the data on either of the other two indlcators. 2

I.

Before indicators for positions with intrinsic rewards
similsr to Kai ser I s could be chosen, the intrinsic re\V'ards
associated with an active staff position in Kaiser had to be
identified.

Five such rewards are the opportunities for

1) a more scientifio practice, 2) a change, 3) more educa
tion, 4) easier
West.

aCC6SS

to facilities, and 5) living in the

Given these intrinsic

re~1ards

of Kaiser, it was pos

sible to generate five predictions from the second hypothe
sis.

Each of these predictions is distinguished by its

dependent variable, which consists of one of five types of
positions defined by the intrinsic reward of each.
Indicators \'lere then sought for fi ve types of posi
tions \<,lth intrinsic rewarcls nimilar to Kaiser IS.

Tl<IO

indi

cators were found for positions offering the opportunity for
a more scientific practiclJ; two indic8.tors tlere also found
for positions offering the oppottunity for more education.
Three Here found for positions offering the opportunity for
a change.

One indicator was found for pOSitions offering

easier access to facilities; one was also found for a
l~~~~, pp.

35-39.

II

I:

i

I

,I
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position offering the opportl.1nj.ty to

liv~

i

i

I

:

I

1n the \·lest.

Thus, although only five prect1ct1ono '';81'e generated frol:.1 the

. Ii
I I
:I

second hypothes1s, nine ind1cf].tora were identified for its
independent variable.
Discussion \<1il1 vegln Y11th the findings \-lhich support

the second hypothesis.

.the five pred1c.tions
esis.

These findings concel'n two out of

~'lhlch ~lel~e

generated from this hypoth

These two predictlono pertain to physicians

\~'ho

entered Kaiser from positions offering the opportun1ty for a
more scientific practice and from positions offering the

:I
I

I

I

i

opportunity for a ohange.

It must be noted that in all but one of the tables in
this chD.ptel"' at lea.st seven cases are

m1ss~.ng

from the first

i i

: I
: I

time periOd. because relevant data on these physicians \OTore
not available.

In some tables the total number of casee

: I
I I

missing is highel".

This occurs e1ther because informa,tlon is

miss1ng on many physiCians or because the categories in the

table do not apply to the entire universe of Kaiser
physicians.
I.
Posl.~1ons Offeri.~~

a MOl"'e

D..A.TA FOR HYPOTHESIS T1JiO

the O..,.upo£,tun1 ty for

Scl~nt_1Xl.~. .l~r:actlc~

.First Indicator.
---

One ot the intrinsic

re~~rds

of

Kaiser is the opportunl ty to prov ide more scientific care.

The first indicator for a pos1.tlon pl"'ovld.lng similar rel,rard.s

I I

100

1s prev10us position emphasizing the soientific rather th.o:'l.n
clinical aspects 01' care.

Table XVIII showa that as the

status at Ka1ael" bas increased, high status recruits have
less frequently

COrne

from positions with scientific and

mixed scientific-clinical orientations, lm11e they have more
i'requently come from positions l11th clinical orientations.
As hypothesized, high status recru1ts have decreasingly come
from positions with intrinsic rat-rards similar to Kaiser's.
Second Indicator.

The second indicator for positions

Offering the opportunity to practiCO mor.e scientifically is
specialty or scientific socie-ty memberships.

Again, the

findings support the second hypothesis (Table XIX).

As the

status of Kaiser has increased, the peroentage of high statue
physicians entering Kaiser with one or more specialty or
scientific sooiety memberships has deoreased, uhile the per
centage without any such memberships has increased.

In

other \<Tords, the percentage of high status reoruits ,\fho have
ocoupied. positiona \V'ith intrinsio re\vards similar to
Kaiser's has deorensed over time.

In sum, the seoond hypoth

esis is supported by findings involving both indicators for
posi tiona "Thich, like Kaiser, offer the opportunity for a
mOre soientific
Posi tions

pr~ctioe.

Offer~ng. t.he Qppol~tun1 ty

First Indicator.

for a Change

Entrance into Kaiser involves the

intrins1c rei-;ard opportunity for a change.

A series of

posi'tions clli"tracterized by the ga.me re'\flard is a cal"eer at

101
TABLE }''VIII
SCIENTIFIC/CLINICAL ORn:NTATION OF PREVIOUS POSITION
BY Tn-iE OF ENTR'Y INTO KAISER AI·tONG
HIGH STATUS PHYSICL\NS

(PCI' cent)
Period and statue 01

_ _

Orientation
of Prev10us
Posit1on

1943-53

1k~1

sta ~us)

.... _ _ _

1954-63

~~laer

I

1964-69

(Middl.! status)

Oi1Q'h ate.
__t;C:"_,.........
• tus_)

C11n1cals

19%

19%

24%

So1ent1fic
CllnlcalD

gO

611

Sc1ent11"ioo

10

IS

60
16

100

100

100

10

22

3g

Total
Number

n.a. := 7
aprevlous positIons with clinical orientations to
care include the G.P., military doctor, public health phy
slclan, physician in IndustI'ial or 1nsurance medicine, B.nd.

the administrator.

bprev10us posi tiona \<1'1 th scientific-clinical oriente.
tions to care include the specialist in priva te practice,
hospital practltioner: private aeei.stant, intern, resident,
and post-graduate studunt studYing clinical practice.
0Previous positions with scientIfic orientatIons to
care Include the group practitioner, teacher, researcher,
and the post-graduate student doing research.

TABLE XIX
SCIENTIFIC AND SPEC!ALTl SooIET! MEMBERSHIPS BY TDfE OF ENTRY
INTO KAISER A~!oNG HIGH STATUS PHXSICIANS

(Per cent)
Period and status of Kaiser
Sc1entificS and
Specialty Society
Memberships

1954-63

194-3-53

(LOi"... status)

O·!1ddle status)

1961+-69

(High Status)

o

33%

1J.5%

1'5~
'+
?

1 or l-Iore

67

55

55

100

100

100

12

20

29

Total
~lumber

n.a.

I

J

= 16

aExamples or sCient1fic professional sooieties are the following: the American
Association for the Advancement ot SCienoe, American SOCiety for Clinical Research~
and the V~yo Foundation for Medical Education and Research.

....
o
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changes ln locatlon of practice.

Table XX oummarlzes the

flndlngs relevant to this lndlcator for posltlonu offering
the opportunlty for a change.

As the status of Kaiser

lncreases, the percentage of hlgh status recruits who

~~ve

changed the location of thelr practice one or more times
decreases i in contrast the percentage ,-rho ha va never mavael

the!I' practlces increases.

In other '>lords, high statuo phy

slcians are less frequently entering Kaiser from careers
involving intrinsio rewards simllar to Ka1ser's.
Second Indicator.

Another indicator tor posltions

offerlng the opportunity for a change ls a career involving
one or more changes in specialty.

Table}au reveals that as

the status of Kaleel' has increased, the pSl'centage of high

status reoruits who have changed their specialties ono or
more times has decreased, while the peroentage who have
never made such a change has lncreased.

Thus, hlgh status

recruits have less frequently cOme from careers 1nvolv1.ng
lntrinsic rewards simllar to Kaiser's.
Thlrd..Indlca tor.

A career characterized by changes in

activities is yet another indicator for posItions offering
t e opportunity for a change.

In contrast to the flrst two

i dicators for such positlons, this one yielded negative
f

nd1ngs.

Table XXII reveals that as the status of Kalser

s increased" the pel"centage of high eta,tuB physlcians
ehtering Kaiser "Tho have engaged 1n

t'ltl0

or nore d.ifferent

types of activity since comp19t1on of theil' residency

TABLE XX
CHANGES IN LOCATION OF PRACTICE BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO
Y~ISER AMONG HIGH STATUS PHYSICIANS
(Per cent)
Period and Status of Kaiser
~hanges in
Location of
Practice

1943-53

(LO~l Statu~

.

1954-63

q-1iddle

S%

o

50%
50

Stat~sl

1964-69

(High Status)

50%

1 or More

92

Total

100

100

100

12

16

2g

Number

n.a.

-=

;;.1

50

218.
\

aThe cases of no information are high not only because of missing information
but also because some physicians enter Kaiser who have not yet begun to practice and
as a consequence have never had the opportunity to change the location of their
practice.
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TABLE XXI
CHANGES IN SPEClALTX' BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO
KAISER AMONG BICtH STATUS PHYSICIANS

(Per cent)
Period and status of Kaiser
Changes 1n
~eo1alty

191.J.3-53

(Low ste. tUG)

o

1951t- 63

(I-l:1ddle status)

6g.2%
3l .S

60.0%
40.0

1 or Hore
Total
Number

1961.J.-69

(Hl~h

100.0

100.0

10

22

Sta,tu!L

6g.4%
31.6
100.0
:;S

n.a·;:7

--------------------------------------...--------------
TABLE XXII

CHANGES I~! ACTIVITIES BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO
KAISER Al·l0NG HIGH STATUS PHYSICIANS

(Per oent)
Period and Status of Kaiser

----------~---~~

Changes in_
B
Actj.vlt1es
... --- 

o

191~3-53

.(~ow

ate. tUB 1

.t!'t1dd~e ~t.atus)

70%

1 or More
Total

Number

1951.J.- 63

-

1964-69

(Hi@_sta ~u~

46%

14-7%

-2.9....

-2L

100

100

-21._
100

10

22

3S

n.B. ':: 7
i\D1ffcrent kinds of actlvi ty 1nclude the follo;'11ng:
private practice, group practice, hospital practice, practice
1n the public hea.lth asrv1c3 Or Vetera.ns Adzn.1nistratj,on, prac
t10e :In the al"r.:lsd forces, teaohing, research, postgraduate
training, practice as a private assistant, and adm1nistrat1ve
medio1ne.
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training has increased, lfhile the percontage \-rho 'have en
gaged in only one type cf e.ct1vity s'.t1ce their residoncy has
deoreased.

Contrary to

e~~ectation,

high statuE physicians

have t10re frequently entered Kaiser from careers involving

intrinsio re't'lards similar to Kaiser's.
In BUrnt we find that the seoond hypothesis is sUPPol'ted

by two out of three indicators for positions or sets of posi
tions l'lhich, like Kaiser, otfer the opportunity for a cfI..ange.
On the balance, we conolude that these findings support the
seoond hypothesis.

Summa£l
The findings "lhleh support the second hypothesis are
listed belOW.

They include both indicator» for positions

offering the opportunity for a more scientlfic practice but
only t\"10 of the three lndicators for positions offering the
opportunity for a change.
1) As the status of Kaieer increa.sed Over time, high
status physiCians less frequently ente:red Kaiser fl"'om

positions emphasizing the scientifio and sclentific
clinical aspects of care; they more frequently en
tered Kaiser from positions emphasizing the clinical
aspects of care.
2) As the ste.tus of Kaiser has increased, the per
cents,go of high eta tus recruits \-lith mC~lbel"ships in
scientif.ic or ep;;lclv.lty societies has el,ccl"eased,
while the percentagEI \'11 thou't Buoh mernbe:'ships has

increased.

3) As the status of Kaiser ~.s increased, high statue
physlcia.ns who have ct't.anged the loea tion 0 f their
pra.ctice have less frequently entered Kaiser; those
who have never made such A. chango have more fre
quently entered Kaiser.

10 7
Kaise~ increased, the percentage
of high status reoruits ,·tho had changed. their specialty
decreased, Hhile the pel'centage of reorui ts who had
never made such a chD.nge increased.

4) As the status of

In general, as the status of Kaiser increased, high
status physicians less frequentl:v entel"ed IO;.lse:r trom posi
tions and careers which, like Kaiser, offer opportunities
for change and Bcientific practice.

The findings oonfirm

two of the five pI'edict1ons which were generatod fl"om the
second hypothesis.
II.

DATA

AG~,\INf3'r

HYPOTHESIS TilO

The findings which fail to support the second hypoth

esis concern predIctions about physicians 't-rho entered Knissl'
from posi tiona offering opportwli ties fer more educe.tion,
for easier access to tacil1 ties J and for living in the

~7est.

All of the ind1cators for these pos1t10ns cons1stently
y1elded nega t'.vt" firJ.d1ngo.

t~~beso

f1nding& are

su.l1liJ1al"i~eti

belOW:
1) As the status of Kaiser has increased, high status
physicians '1ith postgl.'adue,te train1ng r..ave mOl'S fre
quently entered Kaiser, while physicians. without such
training have less frequently entered J~i8er (Table

XXIII).

2) As the status of Kaiser has increased, the percont
age of high status recruits who have had five or more
years of tl'a.lning has 1ncreased, while the percenta.ge
who have had less training has decreased (Table XXIV).

3) As the statuB of Kaiser has increased, high status
physicians r~ve mOre frequently entered Kaiser from
careers in bureaucratic contexts; they t..a.ve less fre
quently oome from careers 1n private practice (Table
XXV) •

I

TABLE XXIII
POSTGRADUATE TR.4.INING BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO
KAISER AMONG HIGH STArl'US PHYSICIANS

(Per cent)
Period and Status of Ka1ser
Postgrad.uate

~aininga

1943-53

(Lo\'1

1954-63

(Middle Status)

Sta tUB)

1964-69

(H'.gh StatU3).

o Yr.

90%

62%

6S%

1 or l{ore 'Yr.

10

3g

32

100

100

100

10

21

3S

Total

Number

n.a.:: g
apostgraduate training refers to medical training, excluding medical school,
1nternship, and residency training.

....
o

01

~=

TABLE XXIV

LENGTH OF TRAINING BY. TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER AMONG HIGH
STATUS PHYSICIANS

(Per oent)
Period and Status of Kaiser

Length ot
TrG..i.ninga

1954--63
(Middle Statue)

1943-53

(Low atatus )

1964-69

(H1gh stat'Us)

O-ll- J.rs.

70%

54%

55%

5 or }!ore"Xrs.

30

46

45

100

100

100

10

22

3g

Total
Number

n.a ..

ALons'b ot t~a~nins ~et.~1 to tbc
res1denoy, and postgraduate tra1n1ng.

~

7

tQt~l numbe~

ot

yea~e 8~ent

in internship,

......

o

'"

TABLE XXV
BUREAUCRATIO/NONBUREAUCRATIO OONTEXT OF CAREER BY TIME OF ENTRY
INTO KAISER AMONG HIm! STATUS PHYSICIANS
(Per oent)
Per10d and Status of Kalser
Context of Career
Nonbureaucratlc S
Bureaucratlcb
Total
Number

1943-53

1954-63

(Mld~le Sta~ust

(Low Sta!us)

47%
53

60%

40

1964-69

(H1gh Status)
2~%

72

100

100

100

5

15

25

n.a.

= 320

SCareers in nonbureauoratl0 oontexts refer to oareers ln private praotice.
bCareers in bureauoratlc oontexts refer to oareers spent ln one or more pos1
tions where faoilities are oentralized and lnoome 1s received in the form of a
salary. Training and military servioe are not oonsidered to be part of a physi
oian's oareer.
°There is a high number of eases ot no information beoause they inolude 25
physicians who entered Kaiser just after completing their training and military
service,
------

--------------------------

.....
.....
o
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4) As the status ot Ka1ser has 1ncreased; higb status

recruits have mOl:'e frequently come from medical schools
1n the North Central a.nd \,ieste!'n states, l:lhereas they
have leEls fl~equently come from schools in the North
east. The percentage coming from the South has varied
inconsistently over time. :en sum, a.lthough 1n the
last time per10d most high status rec~uits came trom
North Central schools, over time the locttt1on of
recru1 ts' schools has var1ed from East to \'lest (Table

XXVI) •

In sum, as the status of Kaiser has 1ncreased, high
status physicians have more frequently entered Ka1ser frOID
pos1tions and careers wh1ch, like Kaiser, offer opportu
nities tor more educat1on, tor eas1er accese to facil1ties,
and tor liv1ng in the West.

These f1ndings fail to support

three ot the five pred1ctions wh1ch were generated from the
second hypothesis.

III.

DISCUSSION

The f1nd1ngs both for and aga1nst the second hypoth
esis have nO\-1 been presented in full.

The evidenoe confirms

two of the pred1ct1ons l>1hlch '''''ere generated from this hypoth
ea1a, but fails to conf1rm three othel"s.

In other vlords, the

f1nd1ngs are 1nconolstent.
Furthermore, we have not been able to discern any pat
tern to the posit1ve and negat1ve f1ndings, l>lhich 'tv-ould allo""
us to account for the success of certain predictions and the
lack of success of others.

Although a var1ety of conclu

sions m1ght have been dral"n from the data,

't';e

lack the evi

\-!O~ld

do not

lihether to accept B.ll the find1ngs a B valid or

knOt1

be ne.eded to cboose among them.

Thus J we

dence \vhlch

II
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TABLE XXVI
REGIONAL Il>OATION OF MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIllE OF ENTRY
INTO KAISER AHONG HIGH STATUS PHISICIANS

(Per cent)
I

Period and Status of Kaisor

--------~~~~~~~~~~~;~~~.---------

1943-53

Location of

Medical Schools
(LOi 1 status)
.
._
r

~

~-.

Northeast

59%

To"tal

Number

196~·-69
(H1~h Sta tU~l

20%

29

31

6

16

62
12

100

100

100

17

19

31t

6

Weat

t

37%
16

South
North Central

1954--63

(Middle stat:as

-

6

aThis reg10nal breakdo'\rn of the United States comes
from the follol-T1ng source: U. S., Bureau or the Census,
U. S. Census of the Population) 1960: Characteristics of
the POE,!!la t10n, IlJS't. AI Number or Tnliii13I"feJlitS" (HashIng'fon,
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961), I,02_

bThe seven cases of m1ssing infor~atlon represent
high status physicians from foreign medical schools.
only some 01' them, that is, only the pos1tll.ve or only the
neg8. ti ve f1ndings.

In other wordE!, the fimtings are i.ncon

elusive.
Although "fe are unable to drairv any general concluslona
as to why the find1ngs are incons1stent, \V'e can offer aug··

gestlons abou·t part1cular cases of negative findings.

In

II,
,

I
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the following discussion,
account for some of the
esis.

VB

will speculate about ways to

flndl~gB

against the second hypoth

Two possible sources of arror will be d1scussed:

1) the validity of Indicators used jn certain pred1ctl~n8

and 2) the absence of controls on exogenous factors which
might be lnt errelat ed wl th the var1ebles used 1n certain
prad1ct10ns.

Both 1ndicators for posit10118 offering the opportunity
for mere education, i. e., postgr-aduat e stu'iJllSnt ami a career
involving extensive training, y1elded nega\:ive findings.
One reason ma.y bi) thnt the opportunity for more educatlon is
an incentive for mobility for only certain kinds of
physicians.
Two types of si tuat10ns can be suggested in wh1ch the
incentive value of ·th1s reward would vary.

First, the

opportuni ty for more educat10n mfty be an inrportant intrinsic
re\'lard only for physicIans' ",ho want to take their Amerioan
Specialty Board Exams 1n order to obtain cert1fication but
'/ho f1rst need to do additional study.

Second, it may be

impol"tr<,nt only to lou status physicians enter1ng Kniser but
not to high statuG phys1ci(;1.nc.

For any gi van set of physi

cIans, 1t may be 1mportant to see the opportun1ty for more
education provided by Knisel'" as one

01" El

set of alternatives.

For instance, although Ka.iser may be 'able tc offer better

I
I'
I
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educational opportunities than pr1vate practice, it probably
offers poorer. opportunities than teaching or researoh.

Sup

pose that many high status physioians l'lho apply tor posl tiona
in Kaiser have a ohoioe between practioing In KaiDer B.na.
teaching or doing research.

Then the opportunity for more

education lIQuId not be a Dignlflca,nt intrinsic revrard ot
Kaiser trom their point of view, although it might be fl"'om

the pOint of view 01' a low status reoruit.
In sum, it haa been suggested that the opportunity for
more education 1s an inoentive for mobility for only certain
kinds of physioians. If this assertion is corrent, then it
may aooount tor the nagatlve findings vlhich \'lere based on
the assumption that the opportunity for more education is an
intrinsic rel18.rd for all physioians.

i'pe Changin~ Specia.l,!!y ComE-osition
Kaiser; A Needed Control?

o~

The prediction conoerning physicians who enter Kaiser
trom positions of'tE;r1ng the opportunity for- more education
may have

yield~a

negative flndings because important exoge

nous variables 'tvero not controlled.

Rayack states that l

"The average length of tr·a.ining for doctors after" completion

of medical school has increased from about two years in 1940
to about thr~e-and-one-halr years in 1959. 1 )

Furthermore,

)Elton Rayack, PrOfessional Pouer and American Nedl
oine: The Eoonomics of the Am"erlcan l;realcal" Association
(OleveIand-:The" "vorld P'ub11shing COiiii)'a.ny-;-1967), p. 112.

•
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be argues that this incl'eflse 1s a product of the trend
to,-;ard specialization.

I'f his e,nalysis is correct l then it

indicates the need fOr aoontro!J. on the changing spec1a,lty
compos1tion of Ka.iser over time.

Perhaps the high status physicians entering Kaiser
I

have increasingly been speoialists in specialties where the
ave:eagEt length of tra1nil1lg is long.

This: 'uould ind1cate

,

that the increase 1n

Ka1~er

reerulte l11th: extensive training

ls due to ohanges in the'I specialty compo8,itlon of Kaiser.
'
Thus, a control on th1s exogenol',s varlable i.s needed. to find
I

I

I

out l*lhether within each group of opecia11sts (each group be
lng deflned by the average length of

tra.~nlng

of phys:tcians

I

wlthin it) high status physicians have

m~re

frequently

I

entered Kaiser with
The Changi!H?':

mor~

or less tralnlng.

C~mpos:t tioa

~.§p.ical Profession:

A

of Pos,i t1ontL, ln' tt~
IeededControl'/ ,

The predictlon concerniqg physic1ahs who enter Kaiser

from posit1ons oftering'easler access to faci11ties yielded
I

,

negative

career ln

find~.ngs.

The! 1ndicator tor such posit1ons
I

I

fI,

bureaucratlc context.

\'laS

,

A

po~sible

a

reason for

these negative flnd1ngs, 1s that no contl'ole ",ere placed on
the changlng compos! tioh of poai t5.ons iry the medlcal
profession.
Da ta found in Rayack r'fwenl the necossi ty tor such a

control.

Rayack documents \lnat he calls the "organizational

revolution in medical

~ra.ct:1.ce. n

He states that, HAs a
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result of these developments, the doctor bas become an organ
lzatlon man, n4 and oi teE! the gro'rlth of both group and hospi
ta.l praotice as evidenoe.

Hie data reveal the increasing

employment of physicians in other kinds ot bureaucratic con
texte as well:

'ihila the percentage of physicians who were

Interns, residents, or full-time hospl tal staff increased
from 6.2 per cent in 1931 to 16.5 per cent 1n 1962, the per
centage in teaching, administration, industry, government
serVice, and retirement inoreased from 7.9 to 19.0 per
cent. 5
In sum, 1t appears that the availability of positions
1n bureaucratic contexts has increased and thus that the
composition of positione in the medical prG:t:'esslon has
changed.

The finding that the peroentage

.Q1'

high status

physicialls entering Kaiser from careers in bureaucratic c·on
texts has Increased Over time

may

be an eft&ct of the chang

Ing oompositlon of positlons 1n the medical profession.
Therefore, a control Is need.ed. on this exoglll'lOUS variable.
The chang1ng composit1on of posltions 1n the medical

profession may have affected another findirlE; 1n the present
study.

The finding 1 s that of an increase in the percentage

of high eta tUG physicia.ns en taring Kaiser

WiIlO

have changed

actlvlt1es one or more times since completlmg their resi
dency training.

A change in actlvity 1nvol'ics either a

~Ibi~~1 pp. 39-40.

5Ibid., p.

46.
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change betrleen different bureaUcl'atlc contexts of act1vity,
such as from teaching to group pl"'8.ctice J or a change

bet\~een

bureaucratio and nonbureaucra.tic contexts, such as from pri
vate to hospital practice.

(See Table XXII ror more detail.)

If the availability of pOs 1tions 1n bUl'eaucl'a tic contexts
has increased) then it is likely that there has been a con
'comitant increase in the opportunity to change activities.
Accordingly, the inoreasein the percentage of high status
physicians entering Kaiser fmo have changed activities one
or more times may reflect th1s increased opportunity for
change rather than a difference in the kind of physician who
enters Kaiser.

Again, a control on thechanglng composition

of positions in the medical profession 1s needed •
•Summary

Since no overall pattern could be discerned in the
findings for and against tho

s~cond

hypothesiS, it remains

unclear why certain prediotions generated from this hypoth
eeis

tlera

successful and others

\'Tel'9

ndt.

The ref Ol"e I our

discuss10n of the findings involved speculation about par
ticular cases rather than a general interpretation.

Prob

lems of invB.licl indlcatol"S and- extraneous uncon... .;rolled vari
ables 1'1ere focused upon.

Suggest~.ons
.

were mde as to the
,

tmys in which they could have influenced some of the findings

against the second hypothesiS.

I

I

CHAFTER V
OONCLUSIONS
In retrocpeot, the nature of the present study oan
best be desoribed ss exploratory researoh.

Tbe literature

of medioal sooiology served as a basis for defining a prob
lem concerning prepaid group practice which, although worthy
of sociologica.l investigat1.on ~ had never been studied before.
A theory was then seleoted to deal with this problem, hypoth
eso(~

wel"'e generated, a design was ohosen I and data l'lere

collected.
However, prior to data oolleotion, no preliminar'y
examination was made of data relevant to the prclJlem.
Acoordingly, it is not aurprlfl1ng tha.t by the tlme the study
had been

compl~ted,

many r!ew ldeas for a bett.)r researzh

design and for slt ernst 1 vo: hypotheses had emerged.
the fruits of the present study undarline the
exploratory research.

nee~

Thus)

for

The present study w1 th 1 t s genorally

inconclusive and negative findings io of \sluo only insofar
as it oan be used to deSign an. alternative study of prepaid
group health plana.
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I.

SUMMARY OF ITHE STUDY

Problem
As a result of thcA.'1A 18 oppoai tion ttl prepaid group
health plans, it 1s likely that these plana experienced d1f
fioulties in reoruitment after they were established.

As

opposition was relaxed, these difficulties probably dls
appearE:d.

Assuming thlltohll.ngcc in the Eloe1e.l oharacteris

tics of physioians enter1ng prept;lid group health plano
i

reflected changes in recrui tment problems t then it is likely
that the kinds of physicians who enter these plans have sys
tematically varied over time.
Such variation presents a problem for research, namely,
to inquire into the direction of and reasons for the va.ri
ation.

The task of the present thesis was to "solve" this

problem.
C~~E1u~!~~ation of the~Probl~

Althougb previous studies ,had not don& so, the entrance
of phyolcians into prepaid group health plans was concep
tualized as mobility between

di~ferent

contexts of work

(c.g., solo pre.ctlco, prepaid group practioe, medical schools,
hospitals, the public health
JUBt1fioation for this

service·~

eto.).

conceptu~lizat1on l'1B.!

The theoretical
thnt the defini

tion of mobility, "Jl1ovement of persons • • • through the
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social structure, f!1 Was bl"'oad enough to include movement
between different contexts of work.
The empirical Justification
Wilensky.

c~~e

from a study by

His factor analysi s of mobi11 ty sholved that the

change between self-employment and 1"lorking for an employel·
(or vice versa) represented one dimension o~ mobl11ty.2
These f1ndings suggested that the movement of physicians into
solo versus prepaid group practice involves one dimension of
mobIlity.

For these reasons, it appeareo. legitimate to

conceptualize the entrance of physicians into prepaid group
health plans in terms of mobility.
!.!!eo~ an~-B.~l1e~_~!
'l~le

topic of this study was the longitudInal

v8.1~1~'.tlon

in the social charaoteristics of phys1c1.ans entering prepa:ld.

group health plans.

Given this topic, the research obJec-

tives were to generate a set of hypotheses to describe

~nd

partially a,ccount for changes in the types of physi"c1ans

have entered prepaid group health plans over time.

\'\rho

Blau's

exchange theory) particularly those sections, on mobil! ty and

recruitment, proved to be the most fruitful source of
lnS Oc 1al Structure, Mob1lity, and Development," Soclal
Structure and Mobil1 ty- in Economj.c Develo:ement, ed. by-Nefr-

;r:-Bmelser-and Seymour-Martin Lfpset-rCh1cagoT Aldlne
l1sh1ng Company,

1966), p.

Pub-

2.

2Harold L. v111ensky) uMeasures B.nd Effect s of t-1obll1 ty,
Soclal S~~uc!.~.r_~~~~}1(~~f?11~~X., ed,. Smelser and Llpset,
pp. 110-111.

II

121

hypotheses for th1s study.3
One of the bAsic propositions of exchange theory 1s
that ind1viduals and collectivities follow the most proflt-

ab+e courses of aotion.

Profit 1s defined in terms of.the

balance betl"ICen reHards and cost s (1. e.

lost).

I

reSOU1"cea

gained and

Rawer-de can be of tll0 basic types--extr1nsl0 and

intrins1c.

Extrinsic rewards, e.g., money, can be used in

any s1 tuat1 on; the benef1 t s of intrinsio revlsrds, e. g. ,

sooial aooeptance, can be gained in only one given situation.
The extrinsio rewards associated with a given posit1on or
colleotivity define the sta.tus, or rank, of that position or

colleotivity.
The first hypothesis of this study was based on two
propositions ,.,hlch

~lere

gener-ated from Blau r 8 discussion of

the relationship of extrinsic ret'lards to mobility and
reoruitment.

Blau states that for a given indiv1dual mobil-·

1ty 1s dependent on his hav1ng the opportunity to receive
higher rewards.

Such opportunities depend on the status ot

the lndivldttal before mobIlity:

high status gives an

ind1 vidual a great er opportuni ty than a1 ther middle or low
status.

The

follo\~;lng

proposition 1.ssuggested:

Oppor-

tunities for: hlgher reuards lead to mobility of high status
individuals.
3Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New

York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 196rn, p~294=30~--peter
M. B1au, "The Flow of Ocoupational Supply and Recruitment,"
ASR, XXX

(1965),

475-1~90.
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Blau also states that for a given collect1v1ty the

allocation of more resources to recruitment depends on suceeseful competition.

Since successful compet1tion involves

an increase 1n status for a collectivIty, the following
propos1tion 1s suggested:

As the status of a collectivity

increases, the rel"lards which l t offers recrul t s will also
1ncrease.
This proposition together with the preceding one suggested the follo't<11ng hypothesis:
As the status (rank) of prepaid group health plans
inoreases, the status (rank) of physicions entering
these plans will increase.
This hypothesis

~le.8

criterIa, i.e.,

achieve~ent

refined by distinguish1ng the various
and ascription, which govern the

distribution of extrinsic rewards:
As the status (rank) of ~'epaid group plans increases,
a) the achieved status of physicians entering these
plans will increase and b) the ascribed status of
these physicians will increase.
Intrinsic as ,"1el1 as extrins1 c rewards may serve as
incentives for mobility.

According to Bleu, intrinsic

rewards vary in the degree to \'ihlch they

sel~ve

as incent1 ves

for mobIlity, depending on the experience which an individual
has had with these rewards in previous statuses (positions).
Accordingly, one might expect that the kinds of intrinsic
retvards rece1 vcd In prevlous statuses affect· the kinds of

individuals who are mobile.

Assuming that both intrins10 and

extrinsic rewards interact in influencing xob111ty, the following hypothesis 1s suggested:
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As the status (rank) of prepaid group health plans
increases, high status recl--ul t S \<lil1 le;ss froqu ently
come from statuses (social pos1 tiona) wi th intrinsic
rewards similar to tho se found in prepaid group plans.
~o~~ge

of_Data and

pe~!gQ

The main source of data for the prese.nt study was the

personnel records of the Portland Ka.iser Foundation Health
Plan.

These reoords inoluded applioations tor starr Member-

ship, a few letters of reference, copies ot personnel advertisements which w'ere placed in the medical journals, ,1ob
1nqulr 1es, and an official schedule of start,lng salaries by
l

speoialty.

Two minor sources of data used to supplement the

information in the reoorda \I10re the ,AlYlA'S

!?ire0E.£;:Y., and

!!me!.!.£~!2-Me~lcal

~ireot~~L~~~2.Y.~C! Intern.~~~l2.!~!2~}!ef!i

denoiee.
--

The design for this researoh was a longitud1nal case
study.

Data "lere presented on the universe ofphys1oiane

l;;hcl

had practiced as full-time, salaried staff In Kaiser at any
time since 1945 when Kaiser was first opened to the public.
This included a few physloisns

11110 entcredKft1seI~

before 1945

when the Health Plan was being run on a striotly war-time
basis, and this exoluded physloians who practiced in Kaisel'a
only during

th{~ l'ISr

years.

Since the klnds of variables

which could be extraoted from the records were nominal and
ordinal variables, oross-tabulation was used in the presentation and analysis of the f1ndings, and gamma wes used as a
measure of association bet"leen orcllnal vari,&bles.
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Indicators
Indicators were needed for four variables:

the status

of Kaiser, the achieved status of physictans, the ascribed
status of physicians, 8.nd positions \dth intrinsio revmrds
similar to those of Kaiser.

Beoause of the small size of

the 'universe of Kaisel" pnys101ans (N:.: l4g) , it seemed prac
tioal to look at var1a.tions in the s·tatus of Kaicer in terms
of lOll, med1um, and high status pel'! ods.
. were needed. to

Thus, indicHtors

not only the direotion but also the tim

ShO';1

ing of changes in the status at Kaissr.
Two indicators were used to determine the direction of
changes in the status of Ke,.tse;r over time:

1) the ratio of

unaccepted applicants to staff! position openings in Kaiser
and 2)

8.

comparison of' the rat/es ot' increase in the starting

salaries of Kaiser

specialist~

the incomes of self-employed

to the rates of increase in

~?ysicians

under sixty-five.

The data on both revealed that, the status of Kalser haa
inoreased over time.

The timing of the changes in the statue

of Kaiser was evident only from the seoond indicator since
data on the first indicator were limited to the period from

1959 to 1969.

Aocordingly, it was found that during the

period. from 19/.l·3 through 1953 Kaiser had low status: 1954-63
wa.s a period of middle status; ft'om 1964 through 1969 the
status of Kaiser wa.s high.
Two indicators were used for the accr1bed status of
physicians end threG were ust1d for their ach1eved status.

125

The prestige of physician s' medl cal schools, of their hospitals of internship and residency, and of the1r references

ware used as indicators for achieved status.

~~e

prestige of

medical schools Was determined from informant ratings C?f the
schools.

An official Al·iA rating of hosp1 tele found in the

~!reo~o!:l_2.f._~EEQ.:Y£~ In!~rnst.!~_a11:d Re~!.de!.1.£!~!! \trae used as

a measure for the prestige of hospitals of internship and
residency.

The prestige of references was inferred from the

prestige of the1l' organizational affiliations.
AMA rating of hospitals

';85 u~ed

as a basis

fOl"

Again, tho
determ1ning

the prestige of these organizations.

Ind1cators for positions with intrinsio rewards similar
to those of Kaiser were found by first identifying intrinsic
rewards assoc1ated with

8~

posi t ion 1n Kaiser and then by

identIfying positions offering similar rewards.

Accordingly,

the following indicators were selected:
Intrinsic Rewards
of K.aisel')
..- ...-.. -.,. .......-- ...
Opportunity for more education
--.-----~---

-.

Positions Offering
Similar Re,\.,ards
---------------

Postgraduate student
Career involving extensive
training

Opportunl ty to proy-id.e morte
sc1ent1.flc CHre

Speoialty or scientific society memberships
Previous position emphasizing
scientific rather than
clinical aspects of care

Opportunity for more convenient aO(~OBS to
facl11tles

Career in bureaucratio
oontext

Opportunity to live in the
West

Medical school student in the

West
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Intrinsic Rewards
of Kai ser

Positions Offering

Similar Re~vards
-_._-------_.

.-~------------

Opportunity for a change

Career of ohanges in specialties
Career of changes in location
of practioe
Career ot ohanges in activities

-

E!ndin~

The evidence for the first hypothesis Was generally
negative.

It 1ndicated that although the status of Ka1ser

.had increased over the years, the status ot physic1ans

entering Kaiser had decreased.

This conclusion \'Ias reached

on the basis of findings using prestige of medical school as
an indicator for achieved status as well as findings using
nationality and length of practice as indicators for ascribed
status.

It was further supported when aotlve/lnactl ve staff

status and length of pract1ce were introdueed as third factors.

Both these controls served to reveal the limiting

conditions of the original relationship.

In revea.ling an

independent effect on the status of Kaiser recruits, controls
011 na~iona11 ty

and In-state/out-or-state loc'B.tion of medical

school also supported the original finding.
The findings using prestige of

hosplt~ls

of 1nternship

and residency and prestige of references as indicators for
achieved status showed that the status of physicians enter1ng

Kaiser had increasod ovel' the yeal's.

Ho'tv6ve;r,

thel~e

ar6 __ 8

number of l"'easons t'or qUestioning the validlty of these
findings:

1) None of these data. apply to th:9

~'lhole

un1.verse
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of Kaiser physicians--from forty to seventy per cant' of the
c~ses

from the

fl~8t

time period ere missing.

2) The dis-

crepanoy between these findings and those Just descrlbed may

reflect the different methode used to rank medical scnools
and hospitals.

3) Based on three dlverse types of indi-

cators for status, the findings

~ainst

the first hypoth-

esis appes.r more persuas1 ve than the findings f!?!: the first
hypothesIs, which are based on only one kind of indicator.
The evidenoe for the second hypothesis

1'1SS

1nconclu-

sive: it indioated that as the status of Kaiser increased,
the percentage of high status reoruits froa certain positions \"11 th lntri.nslc rellal'tds similar to

K~lsert

s deol'teB.sed,

whereas the percentage from other positions increased.

High

status physicians have less frequently entered Ka1eeIl a) having held positions emphl\siz1ng the sc1entl'fl0 aspeots of

cSl'e, b) having memberships in scientific (l·r speoialty
societies, c) having ohanged the location of their
t1co, and d) having ohanged their specialty_

pr~.c-

They' have more

frequently entered Kaiser a) having had pcu;,tgraduate train-

ing, b) having had at least five years of 'raining, c) hav1ng held jobs in bureaucx'stlc contexts J d) having graduated from medical schools in the North Central and Western
states, and e) having engaged in t\vO or mox'e different

types of activities.
The only discernable pattern in thes'a. data 1s that
among multiple indicators for positions of:ter1ng a given

12g

intr1nsio rel.,ard, the findings are genel"ally consl st ant.
Nevertheless, no pattern uh1ch would allow us to account

tor the success and lack of success of indicators related

to oertain intrinsic rewards is apparent in the positive and
negative findings.

'lhere appears to be no rea.son.to suspect

that either the pos1tive or the nogatlve find1ngs are
invalid.

Furthermore, assuming that all the findings are

valid, no theoretical explanation is evident for these
seemingly oontradictory results.

In sum, the find1ngs for

the second hypothesis are inconolusive, and they Will not
be discussed further.

HovTever, aome Bugge:stlons will be

made as to the theoretical significance of the rlndlngs
pertaining to the fl rst hypothesi 9.
II.

DISCUSSION

It ha.s become evident that the first hypothesis of
this study must be rejected.
s!U'11y

!.ollo\~

1:1b[~nd.oned.

However, it does not neces-

tha.t Blau I s theory of mob111.ty must be

Perhaps the lack of success of' this hypothesi S

1s due not to in8.d.equ8.o1es in Blau I
lO\(ing factors.

B

theoT7 but to the fol-

F'irst, the hypotheses of this stud,y

represent much simplified versions of

Bla~'s

theory.

They

poorly refleot the 1nterrelationship of the factors which

in theol'Y influence mobility.

Seoond, the empirical prob-

lem with which this study deals, i.e., varfations over time

in the types of physicians entering prepaid group practice,
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might have been poorly conceptv&lized.
two potential

sou~caa

In light of these

of error, the conclusion is not war-

ranted that the use of exchange theory in the context of
mobt'lity between d.lfferent \</ork contexts 1.8 inappropriate.
The findIngs of this study do not necessar-11y call

the

fOl"

rejeotion of Blnuta theory of mobility.
If Blau t s theory of mobIl1 ty need not be rejected,

then perhaps exchange theory can be used to suggest a fac"

tor explaining the unexpected rela.tionship found bet'lleen

the status of Kaiser end the status of its recruits.

It

'11111 be argued that such e,n explanatory tactor 1s the

intrinsic reward involving the opportunity to participate
in an innovative torm of medioal practice.
It was stated earlier thht in general Blau considers
extrinsic rewards to be more iinportant incent1 ves for
mobi11ty than 1ntrinsic rewards.

However, this implies

that in oertain 81 tuat10ns intrinsio relvards are more

1mportant.

Perhaps such a situation was the opening of the

Kaiser Health Plan in Portland, inasmuch as Kaiser was one

of the first prepaid group health plans 1n the.United
States and claimed to be an innovative form of medical
practice.
Assume that the opportunity to participate in an
lnnovatl ve form of medice.l pl')actloe

\lllG

the most important

lncenti ve for mobili ty lni tlally offered by Kaleel".

the following question arises: what kinds

~r

Then

experiences in
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other positions liould lead physicians to find the opportun1ty to innovate rewarding'

Perhaps, as Romans argues,

it 1s the experience of high status .1~

If so, then the

early importance of the opportunity to innovate in the history of Kaisel:\ would account for the high peroentage of high
status physioians "'Tho entered Kaiser from

1943 through

1953·
Like the extrinsic rewards cffered by Kaiser, the
intrinsic rewards of Kaiser may have changed over the
If at one time Kaiser ceased to provide the oppor-

years.

tunity to innovate, then this would aocount for the decreasing status of physic1ans enter1ng Kaiser after

1953.

Up to this point we have argued that changes 1n the
intrinsic rewards of Kaiser are related to changes in the
status of phys1c1ans entering Kaiser.
ible to

ar~~e

It also seems plaus-

that certain intrinsic rewards, namely, those

involved in the fulfillment of the goals of an organization,
are related to the extrinsic l'teliards off'ered by the organization.

F'or instance, if the

pl)lm~u'\y

operating goal of

Kaiser were low cost medical care for the patient, then 1t
1s likely that

pl"~orlt8

made by the organization would be

used to cut the patient'smedioal expenses.

However, it

the goal were to make the income of Health Plan physicians
4George Caspar Homan 8, ~£Q.!~l Bef!~"~'1q!:L_!~ s ~le~~.n_-:
tarLE2.!:m.! {Ne'w York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 19b1) ,
p. 352.
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competitive with those of private practitioners, then
profits would pl'obably be used to increase physicIans I
salaries and bonuses.
From this example it is clear that intrins10 rewards
associated with the fulfillment of the goals of an organization may be interrelated with the extrins1c rewards
offered by the organization.

If the opportunity to inno-

vate involved the opportunity to plaoe the interest of the
patient above the interest of the physician, then it seems
reasonable to suggest the follor,-ring hypothesis:

As the

1ntrinsio rew'ards of Kaiser changed, the extl"lns1c re'h'ards

also ohanged such that the

star~lng

salarieo offered

recruits were raised.

In sum, the following interrelationship among the
intr1nsic rewards 'of Kaiser, its status, and the status of
ita reoru1ts has been suggested:

ohange in intrinsic
rewards, i.e., opportunity to innovate

change in extrinsic
rewards, 1. e., start 1ng
r salaries

~
~

~. reoruits
change in the status

of

In other words, by revealing the spuriousness of the inverse
relationship found between the status of Kaiser and the

status of its recruits, the factor of intrinsic rewards may
serve to explain this relat1onship.
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III.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE

RESF~RCH

Beoause of the negative, inconolusive findings of the
present study, further research into the problem of changes
in the types of physici.ans ,.;ho enter prepaid group practice
is needed.

If future research into this problem is to be

more successful than the present study, the

follo'~111g

sug-

gestions must be heeded:
1) The design of such a study should include a control
group of private practitioners. The findings of such
a study would then be les8 tentative than the findings
of the present study.
2) Multiple sources of data on physicians should bo
used. For instance, curricula vitae, letters of reference, notes from telephone conversations, as wall
as application forms could be used to ga1n information on physicians in prepaId group health plans.
This would lead to the discovery of the errors whioh
are likely to be found in any given source of data
and allow the researcher to deal with them.
3) Alternat1 ve 1ndlcatol:"s for physicians t achieved

status should be tried out, e.g., the prestige of a
physician's preceptor, an index reflecting the average prestige of a physicians' ohanging organizational
arfl11atlons, and an index baaed not only on the
prestige of:the lnstl tutlon \4!here a Ka'.ser applicant
and his reference were colleagues but also on the
rating given the applicant by his referenoe. In light
of the contradiotory results whioh \tlero obtained from
the variety of ind1cators used in the present study,
it seems that the alternative indioators suggested here
might be more useful.
4) Nel" hypotheses should be formulated, perhaps using

intrinsic rewards as &1 1ndependent variable. Hopefully, they would be supported by the evidenoe.
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APPENDIX A
DATA ON JOB INQUIRIES AND JOB OPENINGS IN KAISER
TABLE XXVII
DISTRIBUTION OF DISCONTINUED JOB INQUIRIES AND ADVERTISED JOB
.QPENTNGa INl<AISD. OVEli TIME

!222
.....tJ--JoJ-H---.: ..- ..

1960

!2.§.g. ~

1;261

~

!2§.2

~

illI

~

... ~

,'''"

~.-

ij:

Inqu1r1es

Source:

3

~':fJ:3u,,:

9

T02

u

''-TglfmT3~:'-cr~:'

'=-~~iilF··':'-=--·

The source ot these data 1s-Kalser's records of personnel advert1se
--:a:c-.----..-.,.

~:=: . . . ._ _ _ _ ~~-~......, __

,.-,-~

.

...-""'~Trl-EHr~

..

»~ .......... _~~~~-.e

....~~I'P_~lP.'IIr."..,'It:I'~~~~~....-.,.----~........- - -.....- - - - - - .
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APPENDIX B
INCOME DATA
I •

INCOME

O~'

SELECrfED GROUPS OF PRIVATE

PRACTITIONERS

TABLE XXVIII
MEDIAN NET INCOMES OF SELECTED GROUPS OF
SELF-EMPLOYED PHYSICIANS UNDER
SIXTY-FIVE, 1959 AND 1963
Phlf?i£!~~_Q!:£!!E.

_!2.22....

Speoialists

$2 11-, goo

Specialists,
under 10 Years
of Pra.ct1oe
All Physicians

!:!!l!!~~l a!!.-2!:ou.E,

l. C' 6;
..--......

-~-.-

Physioians,

under 5 Years of
Practioe

$17,450

22,300

Phys1cians,
5-10 Years
of Practice

25,950

22,100

All Physicians

25,050

The 1959 income data come from P~slclan8'
ReJ2r1 n.t of Artl~lee ~~8ed or! --1rM~9:!.£~.!_.Ec2!22rnlc s nr~!.!,nu!r~E~~!~l.J.....!22Q [Oradell, N.J.:
Rad1cal Economlcs;-!nc., 19501, pp. 9, 10,14. The 1963 data
are from "Results of' Me.~!.~~!~Q0!2.2.~.!£~~ First Annual Checkup
Source:

E~~nlE!gE._.B.!!.~ExEen8e8: _~

of Phy:slcians I Economic Heal th, Tr ~~9:ical EC0!20mi~, November
2, 196~·, pp. 104, 106.
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COMPARI SON OF 'r',fO SOURCES OF DATA ON KAI SER
SALARIES AND INf.'gHE:NGES ABOUT MISSING

SALARY D;;TA
TABLE XXIX
LONGITUDINAL COMPJ\RISON OF STARTING 5ALARIES fi
OF KAISER RADIOLOGISirS (n) AND OHTHO:PEDIC

SURGEONS (ons) AS REPORTED IN TWO
SOURCES Ob" DATJ\

Official
_2~lal~l_ S£!!Qdule_

Year

R

OHS

1951
1961

$lO,t500

$10 ,gOO

-

Personnel Ads 1n

Ke'!.~~lll:..~2-l.!rjl.E). $._ _

R

ORS

19,OOO

1963

$20,000

1961}

20,000

1965

21,~OO

~·")O

\i'~

21~,ooo

24,.000

1966

,

Qf>O
\,'

24 ,000
24,000

196'7

30,000

19GB

30,000

30,000

1969

30,000

30,000

30,000

8These starting salary figures are re-poI'ted 8.t the

board-certified level.
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fl'ABLE'YJ{X

STARTING SALARIES O~ KAIBBR RADIOLOGISTS AND ORTHOPEDIO
SURGEONS OVER TIME B.ASE~D ON COHBIliATION OF Dll.TA
FROM OFFICIAL SALAHY SCHEDULE AND RECOF..DS OF
PERSONNEL l\DVgHTISE14ENTS

!ea;:

Starting Se.lar-iee

of Rand
-------

ORSa

1951
1961

$10,eOO

1963
1964

20,000

1965
1966

24,000

196'7

30,000

1969

30 ,000

1969

30,000

l.g,OOo

20,000

24,000

&SBUHli;}c1 that tht;1Se figures app'roximat e the
Bf.:.. ltl1'ioa of radlolog1. st s ~).nd ox~thop7Jd1 c surgeons

a It 3. S

at
the disoussion on pp. 45-46). The salaries of
radlo1Clgtets t~ncl or.·thopedlc tH.lrgeons are close to those ot

median

Ka1ser

(3B0

the meet highJ.y puld specla.list s at Ke.leor.
S()'lol!"CO:
DutjB, from e.n official schedule of Kaiser
ealel"'lcf.1 Hnd. !':ro.n PGcords of personnel adve:rtisement 8 Wero
B ecause 0 f t-he mEU17
. 1 ns t ances of
comparou.!:1 ("',",·l.
l8,~'J.. e, -"'y'l'-r)
A ..... A .
identic!),). 1nf'ornC1.t.~u:Hl in the t'¥lO sets at d20.ta a.nd beoause
of the hi.gh degx'f;;'!o of cons! at enoy bet\'ieen them, (there \-T8.S
only c'r!fJ di sOl·ep~}.nc;y), l t S t'),emed feasible t.o combine them.
Therel)y, more comr;r(~hen Ei VB s~tlary de.ta \'le-:re obtalned.
Furthermore, bI.3Cau::~E! of the high agreement bet\1een the
schc<lu10s for J's.d:lologi.sts l':.nc1 orthopedic £urgeona \lllthln
both sets of data, it seemed reasonable to assume that
thes~ two specialtice had identical selary schedules.
Aocordingly, tho data on those specialties were also
ccmblnecl.
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III •

ABSOLUTE COMl)j\.RISON OF INCO!~1ES OF KAISER
SPEOIALISTS AND l)HIVATE PRAClrITIONERS
TABLH~

XXXI

LONGITUDINAL COMPARISON OF ST.P..RTING SALARIES OF ONE
GROUP OF KAISER SPECI.~!.LISTS (IM .... GS-OBG-PD) TO
MEDIAN NET IN COMES OF SELF -Er·1PLOYED

PHYSICIANS UNDER SIXTY-FIVE

Years

---

Start1ng Salary

0b

!~!ser_~~ia~~8t

_

Years

Income of Self~~£12.lJ! d Phl.~!.£ 1an

---

1949

$ g,400

191.).7

$ S,7 44

1953

10,gOO

1951

13,150

1956

12,000

1955

16,017

1959
1.962

13,200

1959

22,100

16,200

1962

24,300

1965

21,200

1964

2g,3g0

SIt will be noted that the years from which eaoh set
of income data oome ara not identical. The years for which
the Kaiser data are reported were chosen not only to correspond to the data on self-employed physicians but also to
compensate for the Kaiser policy. of interspersing period1.c
large salary inoreases 'tIl th pelliods of no salary inoreases.
bFo:r.t reasons explained in the text (pp. 45-47>, those
startlng sala.ry f1gures for the IH-GS-OBG-PD gro~p of Ka! ser

apec1a11gts are interpreted to be representative of the
medlnn start1ng salary of the Kaiser physlc1e.n.

Souroe: The Kaiser data came from sn official schedule of starting salar1es. The 1947-62 data on self-employed
physicians came from "Physicians' Economic Health, IS Medical
EconomicD, November 2, 1964-, pp. 64-65; the 1964 data came
rrcm-E~lt6n

Rayack, Professional POl'tar and Ame!'lcan Medioine:
'rhe Economics of theAmerican-11edlcal--AsSoc1atlonTOleve-lana:

'rne

WorIa--Pubn·tih1ng-Company;-196rr;-p:-IfO:----

APPENDIX C
UNANTIOIPATED PROBLE;!·1S

The main

SOUI'Cf~

of data on Kaiser physicians used in

the present study \'ras the application

fOI'

staff membership,

a standardized form filled out by all Kainer physicians.
It ties ohosen instead cf physicians I curx'lcula vltae on the

asaur.1ption that it ,,,ould provide more

systemat~. c

and com-

plete information on each physician than the curricul:a.

However, as shol'm by the data, th1.s assumption vias false.

In retrof.peot, it appears that the neoision to use the
applioation forms as a

SOlll"ce

of da.ta was not sound. 1

In the follow1ng discussion three pll!toblems which the

use of the application forms raised will be described.

Two

questions will be posed with reference to each problem:

1) Did it lead to systematio or random var1.atlon in the

completeness of the data?
random errors in the data?

2) D1d it lead to systematic or
In this

"vlay tif)

\tIlll assess the

lFrom tho standpoint of research strategy, it 1s
lmpor"tri.nt to understand. hOlf this H1 tuation arose.

TV-TO

fa.c-

tors seem primary: the researcher's lack of experience in
working with different sources of data and the necessity of
working through an 1ntermediary in order to gain access to
the data. As a result, the researcher never went directly
to the various sources of data. Lack1ng ths opportunity to
determine the informat1on in and the merits of each, the
researcher never gained experience ,\'11th the sources until
after the decision to use one of them had already been made.
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extent to which these probltms effeot the validity of the
find1ngs of the present study.

I.

FIRST PROBLEM

The first problem which

\~as

discovered concerned the

bureaucratio use of the appl1cation forms.

The so-called

"applications for staff member'shlp" are not used as applications for actlve staff status 1n Kaiser, since the physicians do not fill them out until after they have already
assumed active staff status.

are used as application forms.

Instea.d, the curricula vitae

During the time that person-

nel deoisions are being made, the latter provide written
information about the physicians.

After the physicians have

already become Kaiser staff members they fill out the "e,pp11-

cation fo!' staff membership," \'lhich seems to represent a
'bul:'eaucl"latic procedure for information storage end l·etrieval.
The bureaucratic use of application forms for informa-

tion

stor~1ge

study:

and retrlevalpr'esented a pr-oblem for this

1 t appeared. that informat1.on \-'ss miss1ng from the

fOl-:.rns e.s a result of the use to '-lhi ch the forms were put.

This became apparent from the instances when
v1.ta.t3 '-lel'a found 'Wi th the application forms.

~he

curricula

In comparison

to the appJ.i cation forms, the curricula pro"';lc1ed more com-

plete and systematic information on the physicians.
E'~ppeRI·ed

Thus, it

that the curricula, in serving as applications, are

filled out "ll th more

C.9,re

tha.n the application forma, ,,,hose
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only purpose 1s record-keeping.
Unfortunately, it 1s not known whether this problem
1ntroduces systematic or rendom variation into the completeness of the data for this study, as in only

8

few instances

was compar! son of the application fOl'tms nnd current currioula vitae poss1ble.

No eVidence of systematic variation was

.d1 soovered 1n the course of dS.ta gather1ng.

In other words,

it did not appear that either the kind or the extent of
lnrol'~mation

missing for eaoh physician lias correlated "11 th

his status (rank) or with any other variable used in this
Hovlever, the limited ev1dence aV'al1able allows no

study.

general conclusion about any variation whIch might have

been introduced into the oompleteness of the data.
Nevertheless, it is likely that the use of the application forms as a source of data
coding errors into the data.

~or

this

Btud~

introduced

Compar1son of the currioula

vitae to the application l:'"orma shovled that lnt erpretatlons
of the data which ''\Tere ba.sed on both these sources of d8.ta

were different from those based on only a single source.
Howevel~:t

since the curricula vi tee were genex·c.lly unavail-

able, it waslmposslble to compere tho currioulum of each
physician to his e.ppJ.1cation form in oreler to eliminate the
coding errors which would result from the usa of the application forms alone as a source of data.

Consequently, the

use of the application forms as a

of date. probably led

SOUrC(1

to errors in the data of this study.
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Since it 1s not known whether cases of miss1ng infor-

mation are randomly or syotematlcally distributed within the
universe of Kaiser physicians, 1 t 1s also unknown \'lhether
the coding errors \-lhleh result from the missing information
are r.sndomly or systematically distributed \IIi thin the universe.

Therefore J there is no ''lay to assess the dogree to

which the validity of the 1~eBult8 of this study is effected
by the problems of mlss1.ng information t1hlch arise from the

bureaucratic use of the

II.
~'he

applic!~tlon

fOl'''ms.

SECOND PROBLEM

second problem which

l'\TaB

discovered involved

bureaucratic changes in the format of the application

fOl"IT!B"

The various forms which Wel"e used over the years oall for
d1fferent types and amounts of information on each phys1-

cian.

2

As a result, some items of informatlon are miss1ng

for phYSicians who filled out

~ertain

types of application

forms.
2~rhe earliest source of information discovered for any
physlci.fln lias not G·ven a form but merely a typed sheet of 1nf6rmat1on covering training, professional societIes, and cert1fle8.tton. The first appl1cation form asked for training,
practlce~ certif1cation, ~nd m1l1tary service.
Neither of
these two sources of data were dated.
Ovex' the years, two other application forms were used,
each of which asked for the same kinds of information. One
was put into use about 1955 and seems to have been tilled. out
annually unt5.1 1959. In that year the Bess Kaiser Hospital
1n Portland W&s opened to replace the Vancouver, Washington
hospita.l, and tho appllcatlon form \i h1ch is in current use
waf=; introduced.. The sti~ff l':ho transfel'1lrso. from Vancouver to
Portland filled it out once. After 1959, new stafr aleo
filled it. out only once upon entry into Kv.iser.
T
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The problem of bureaucratic changes 1n the format of
the application

fOl")illS

clearly introduced a systematic bias

into the completeness of the data for this study.

Compar-

ison of the information 1n the most recently introduoed
torms (1959) reveals that physicians loJ'ho entered Kaiser
after 1959 filled them out much more completely than physl'clans l'Tho entered Kaiser befol"'O 1959 and \V'ho filled out the
torms in

1959 upon transfer to the

Beas Kaiser Hospital in

Portland from the hosp1 tal in Vancouver.

\)'1 th regard. to the

forms used before the current type of appl1cat1on fOl"m

",as

instituted (i.e., before 1955), the more recent forma oontain more information than tbe oldel' forms; furthermore, All
these forms contain les3 information than the current type of
form.

These comparisons show that the earlier a physician
entered Kaiser, the higher the probability that data on him
are not complete.

In other words, the completeness of tbe

data on any physician verles according to the time he entered
Kaiser.

Since beth the status of Kaiser and the status of

its recruits also vary over time, it 1s likely that these
v&1"'lat1ons in the completeness of the data onphys1.clans are

systematically correlated with either the status of Kaiser
or the status of its recruits, or both.

Thus, it 1s clear

that bureaucratic changes in the format of the application
forma introduced e. systematiob1as into the oompleteness of

the data for the present study.
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However, it is unlikely that

tras

bias in the com-

pleteness of the data led to systematio coding errors.
Since all the app11cation forms \!h1ch had been used over the

years were available, the vaI'lety of forms whioh had frequently been filled out by a given phys1cian could be compered.

Instances of information missing on any given form

could be identified and thus many potential coding errors
avolded. 3

For

eX8~ple,

the 1959 application form ofphyslcians

who entered Kaiser bet""een 1955 and 1959 was compared to the

torm which was used between 1955 fmd 1959.

Although the 1959

form was generally inoomplete, it was usually possible to
find a complete form by

loca·~ing

the first form which had

been filled out by these physicians.
torms could be compared for physicians

between 1952 and 1955.

Similarly, several

,,-mo

left Kaiser

Thus, the inadequacy or

~ny

partio-

ular form could be compensated tor to some extent.

Although these

comp(~laons

eliminated many potential

coding errors, some errors probably pould not be avoided.
The information called for on both forms which were used
priOl" to 1955 1s leas extensl ve than that on the forms used

after 1955.

Therefore, the l.nformat1on on physicians "lho

3Actually, the neceoslty for comparing and mak1ng
inferenoes from different forms may have led to some coding
errors. The complexity and length of some of the physicians'
careers plus the great amount of information to be compared
before inferences could b~ made inevitably resulted in Borne
errors.

147
t1lled out the former torme 1s probably less complete than
the informat1on on physicians who filled out the latter
torms.

In sum, bureaucratic ohanges in the format of the

app11cation forms have probably led to a slight systematic
bias in

t~e

completeneos of the data tor this study.
III.

THIRD PROBLEM

The third problem wh10h \V'ss discovered involved the

misBing personnel recorda of the ten physicians l1ho left

Kaiser before 1952.4 As a result of this problem, the present study contains almost no data on these physicians.

These missIng personnel records systematically bias
the completeness of the data for this study.

All the miss-

ing recorda come from the period 1943 to 1953 when Keiser had
low status.

In other words, the m1ssing records are cor-

related with the status of Ka1ser.

As a result"

the com-

pleteness of the data for this study is systematioally
b1ased.
4Although it is possible that records were not kept
durlng the first years of Kaiser's operation, there 1s ev1(lance Which 1ndica.tes that recortts ~Tere kept and that the
records on the physic1ans who left Kaiser before 1952 disappeared. F1rst, complete information, including curricula
vitae, letters of reference, and various early app11cation
torms, was found for one physician who applied to and
entered Kaiser around the end of 1945. Tnts suggests that
written reoorda of some kind were kept even on the earl1est
Kaiser physicians. Second, an informant repol'lted that m!-tny
years ago all the records cn the Kaiser staff disappeared and
that later only those of the active statf reappeared. The
reoords of physicians who became inactive prior to 1952 we~e
missing.

r-

14g
The only l'ee,dily available alt ernatlve source of data
on these physicians, the

Am~r.!.2.£~._1-1~d1c?1 ~lr~ctor.l,

con-

tained only one item of relevant informe.tion cn each physi-

clan, namely, hie medical school.

Consequently, there.was

no way to compensate tor the lack of data on these physiclans in the Kaiser personnel records.

Therefore, many of

our conclusions concerning physioians who entered Kaiser
between

19 43

and

1953

may be in error.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The three problems wh1ch l'rel"le raised by the use of the
staft app11cation-s as a source of data for this study have
now been described in tulle

With regard to the first prob-

lem, which conoerned the bUl"eau.cratic use of the application
forms, it was not possible to determirle definitely 1) 't..rhether
it had led to systematic or random var1ation in the oomplete-

ness of the data and 2) whether it had led to systematic or
random errors in the coding of the data.

In oontrast, it was

cleEU~

that the second and third

problems, which involved bureaucratic changes in the format
of the forms and ten

mlssi~g

personnel records, had produoed

systemat1c var18.tlon in the completeness of the date..

How-

ever, only the missing personnel reoords may have led to
errors in the data.

In partioular, some of our conclusions

concerning the physicians ~lho entered Kaiser from 1943 to

1953 may

be false.

We conoluue that the validity of aome of
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the results of this study is questionable.
As a result of our discovery that the application

torms did not provide systematic and complete 1nformation on
each Kaiser phys1cian, the soundness of the decision to use
these forms as a SOUI'ce of data for this study must be ques·-

tloned.

If the present study could be done over aga1n, the

staff appl1cations would not be chosen as the sole source ot
data..

Rather, multiple

SOUl~ces

of data, e.g., the applica-

tion forms as well as curricula vitae, letters of referenoe,
etc., would be used.

The disadvantages of any part1cular

source of data could then be identified and dealt ",·lth.

Typod by
Frances T. Hall

